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ABSTRACT 
 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for protecting all U.S. 
borders. CBP protects all air, land, and seaports, as well as the areas on the border 
between the official ports of entry. Drug trafficking organizations and human trafficking 
organizations continually target gaps in CBP’s infrastructure, practices, and 
methodologies to exploit any shortfalls. Outside of technology and infrastructure gaps, 
CBP employees themselves are targets for criminal organizations. Criminal organizations 
look to corrupt current employees or insert a member of the criminal organization as a 
new employee to further their criminal enterprise. 
 This thesis investigates the human element in insider threats and employee 
corruption, as well as whether current nontechnology-based CBP tactics to combat 
insider threats and employee corruption requires additional fortifications. One 
incentive-based and one anti-corruption program are studied to determine if those 
programs can benefit CBP. CBP has a unique and challenging operational environment. 
This thesis addresses the unique operating environment encountered by CBP and 
provides recommendations to fill the gaps in current nontechnology-based insider threat 
and anti-corruption methodologies used in CBP. 
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The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provided the legislation to establish the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which gathered all federal agencies involved in 
such security under one umbrella.1 Various legacy immigration and customs agencies 
merged to create the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within this DHS umbrella. 
CBP’s mission is to protect and secure the U.S. border against terrorist attacks, the 
importation of dangerous contraband, and illegal entry of criminals, terrorists, foreign 
intelligence officers, and undocumented aliens. CBP employs more than 60,000 personnel 
and has over 45,000 sworn law enforcement officers, the largest of any U.S. law 
enforcement entity.2 In this way, CBP serves a vital defense function. 
Like many organizations, CBP is vulnerable to employee misconduct and 
corruption;3 however, border agency vulnerabilities extend beyond these known and 
expected improprieties. A 2012 Government Accountability Office study reported arrests 
of CBP employees for misconduct, such as domestic violence or driving under the 
influence from fiscal years 2005 to 2012, and 144 former or current CBP employee arrests 
or indictments for corruption-related activities, such as smuggling of aliens or drugs.4  
 
1 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Vision and Strategy 2020, CBP Publication Number 0215-0315 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 6, 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf. 
2 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Final Report of the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 12, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSAC%20CBP%20IAP_Final%20Report_FINAL%20
(accessible)_0.pdf. 
3 Merriam-Webster defines misconduct as “intentional wrongdoing; specifically: deliberate violation of 
law or standard especially by a government official.” Merriam-Webster, s.v. “misconduct,” accessed 
September 5, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misconduct. Cornell Law School defines 
corruption as “a government official, whether elected, appointed, or hired, who asks, demands, solicits, 
accepts, or agrees to receive anything of value in return for being influenced in the performance of their 
official duties.” “Public Corruption,” Information Institute, accessed April 12, 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/public_corruption. 
4 Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP 
Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct, GAO-13-59 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2012), 2, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf. 
xiv 
Literature regarding insider-threat mitigation mainly deals with these risks in the 
cyber realm, but a corrupt CBP officer or agent working at a port of entry (POE) would not 
necessarily gain access to classified databases or generate intelligence reports, as only 
approximately 22% of the CBP workforce has a security clearance.5 Most CBP employees 
with a security clearance work in management, intelligence units, or special operations. 
Instead, the corrupt CBP officers would more likely allow persons or items to enter the 
country without inspection. To do so, they would likely inspect either the driver but not the 
vehicle or passengers. This tactic obviously does not require access to classified databases 
nor does it leave a cyber-trail; therefore, a computer algorithm tracking access to 
unauthorized databases will fail to identify the act. 
The CBP Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), or internal affairs (IA), 
investigates and fights employee corruption and misconduct, but it does not have a policy 
either to identify or mitigate insider threats proactively. Rather, OPR manages insider 
threats reactively through two methods: (1) OPR waits until a source of information 
provides intelligence regarding criminal activity or misconduct, and (2) OPR waits until an 
employee triggers an information technology (IT) mechanism that reveals criminal activity 
or misconduct. The flaw with a reactive approach is that the incident, and thus the damage, 
has already occurred. A proactive approach mitigates insider threats by identifying cues, 
actions, or triggers associated with corruption before a crime is committed. 
Effective solutions to mitigate corruption are those that incentivize employees to 
report crimes and programs that recruit employees as surreptitious “eyes and ears” within 
an organization. The New York Police Department (NYPD) Voluntary Assistance Program 
(VAP) is an exceptional program in which employees act as an Internal Affairs Bureau 
(IAB) force multiplier. The VAP recruits employees who volunteer to act as the “eyes and 
ears” within the organization. VAP participants work their regularly assigned posts but also 
report findings of corruption to their assigned handlers. All VAP participants’ identities are 
kept confidential, even to other VAP participants and IAB staff. Only the VAP participants’ 
handlers and IAB management know their identities. Maintaining the participants’ 
 
5 Information obtained through the researcher’s duties and operational knowledge of CBP. 
xv 
identities confidential is important for the safety of the participants, as well as to ensure 
operational viability for continued operational deployments.  
Crime Stoppers is also a unique program that provides financial incentives to report 
crimes while protecting the identity of the reporting party. The program is exceptional 
because it provides anonymity and a monetary incentive for persons who might otherwise 
not feel the moral obligation to provide information or who might fear reprisal for 
cooperating with law enforcement. 
CBP will benefit from the adoption of incentive programs. The challenge is to 
determine whether existing approaches are scalable and how much modification they 
would require for the unique CBP environment. CBP is a federal law enforcement 
organization composed of approximately 60,000 employees with jurisdiction throughout 
the United States. CBP employees are represented by three different labor unions with 
whom negotiations to enact such approaches would be necessary. Labor unions do not 
affect the CBP mission or the integrity of CBP personnel. However, any change identified 
as a change in work environment or established past practice typically requires labor 
contract re-negotiation. Lastly, CBP has employees stationed throughout the world where 
U.S. laws may not apply. CBP employees stationed abroad must still follow CBP’s policies 
and procedures, but criminal statutes vary from country to country that can possibly hamper 
criminal prosecution or extradition for criminal acts committed outside the United States.  
xvi 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provided the legislation to establish the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which married all federal agencies involved in 
such security under one umbrella.1 Various legacy immigration and customs agencies 
merged to create the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within this DHS umbrella. 
CBP’s mission is to protect and secure the U.S. border against terrorist attacks, against the 
importation of dangerous contraband, and the illegal entry of criminals, terrorists, foreign 
intelligence officers, and undocumented aliens. CBP employs more than 60,000 personnel 
and has over 45,000 sworn law enforcement officers, the largest of any U.S. law 
enforcement entity.2 In this way, CBP serves a vital defense function. 
Like many organizations, CBP is vulnerable to employee misconduct and 
corruption;3 however, border agency vulnerabilities extend beyond these known and 
expected improprieties. A 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study reported 
arrests of CBP employees for misconduct, such as domestic violence or driving under the 
influence from fiscal years 2005 to 2012, and 144 former or current CBP employee arrests 
or indictments for corruption-related activities, such as smuggling of aliens or drugs.4 
 
1 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Vision and Strategy 2020, CBP Publication Number 0215-0315 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 6, 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf. 
2 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Final Report of the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 12, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSAC%20CBP%20IAP_Final%20Report_FINAL%20
(accessible)_0.pdf. 
3 Merriam-Webster defines misconduct as “intentional wrongdoing; specifically: deliberate violation of 
law or standard especially by a government official.” Merriam-Webster, s.v. “misconduct,” accessed 
September 5, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misconduct; Cornell Law School defines 
corruption as “a government official, whether elected, appointed, or hired, who asks, demands, solicits, 
accepts, or agrees to receive anything of value in return for being influenced in the performance of their 
official duties.” “Public Corruption,” Information Institute, accessed April 12, 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/public_corruption. 
4 Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP 
Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct, GAO-13-59 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2012), 2, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf. 
2 
Within the agency, employee misconduct occurs more often than criminal corruption, but 
employee criminal corruption is arguably a more serious threat to the homeland than 
employee misconduct. Literature regarding insider-threat mitigation mainly deals with 
these risks in the cyber realm, but a corrupt CBP officer or agent working at a port of entry 
(POE) would not necessarily gain access to classified databases or generate intelligence 
reports, as approximately only 22% of the CBP workforce has a security clearance.5 Most 
CBP employees with a security clearance work in management, intelligence units, or 
special operations. As a result, the corrupt CBP officers could easily allow persons or items 
to enter the country without inspection. To do so, they would either likely inspect the driver 
but not the vehicle or passengers. This tactic obviously does not require access to classified 
databases nor does it leave a cyber-trail; therefore, a computer algorithm tracking access 
to unauthorized databases will fail to identify such an act. 
The CBP Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), or internal affairs (IA), 
investigates and fights employee corruption and misconduct, but it does not have a policy 
either to identify or mitigate insider threats proactively. Rather, OPR manages insider 
threats reactively through two methods: (1) OPR waits until a source of information 
provides intelligence regarding criminal activity or misconduct, and (2) OPR waits until an 
employee triggers an information technology (IT) mechanism that reveals criminal activity 
or misconduct. The flaw with a reactive approach is that the incident, and thus the damage, 
has already occurred. A proactive approach much more quickly mitigates insider threats 
by identifying cues, actions, or triggers associated with corruption. 
Effective solutions to mitigate corruption are those that incentivize employees to 
report crimes and programs that recruit employees as surreptitious “eyes and ears” within 
an organization. The New York Police Department (NYPD) Voluntary Assistance Program 
(VAP) is an exceptional program in which employees act as an Internal Affairs Bureau 
(IAB) force multiplier. The VAP, created after the Commission to Investigate Allegations 
of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption of Procedures of the Police Department, also 
 
5 Information obtained through the researcher’s duties and operational knowledge of CBP. 
3 
known as the Mollen Commission, published recommendations in 1994.6 In this way, the 
NYPD institutionalized an incentive program to root out corruption. 
The VAP recruits employees who volunteer to act as the “eyes and ears” within the 
organization. VAP participants work their regularly assigned posts but also report findings 
of corruption to their assigned handlers. All VAP participants’ identities are kept 
confidential, even to other VAP participants and IAB staff. Only the VAP participants’ 
handlers and IAB management know their identity. Maintaining the participants’ identities 
confidential is important for the safety of the participants, as well as to ensure operational 
viability for continued operational deployments. The program is significant because it 
institutionalizes and formalizes the rooting out of corruption in a systematic and regular 
way.  
Crime Stoppers is also a unique program that provides financial incentives to report 
crimes while protecting the identity of the reporting party. The program is exceptional 
because it provides anonymity and a monetary incentive for persons who might otherwise 
not feel the moral obligation to provide information or fear reprisal for cooperating with 
law enforcement. Greg MacAleese, an Albuquerque, NM, police officer, founded Crime 
Stoppers in 1976.7 Officer MacAleese created the program because of the lack of 
information regarding an ongoing murder investigation. Now, Crime Stoppers is an 
international program with approximately 1,148 programs worldwide.8 Information 
provided to Crime Stoppers has led to 965,163 arrests, 1,501,776 solved cases, 
$2,122,776,681 worth of personal property recovered, and $8,976,384,548 in drug seizures 
worldwide.9 Literature on incentive-driven corruption-mitigating strategies, psychology-
based game theory, and social dilemma studies demonstrate that incentive strategies result 
 
6 Harold Baer Jr. and Joseph P. Armao, “The Mollen Commission Report: An Overview,” New York 
Law School Law Review 40 (1995): 2.  
7 Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Arthur J. Lurigio, and Paul J. Lavrakas, “Enhancing Citizen Participation and 
Solving Serious Crime: A National Evaluation of Crime Stoppers Programs,” Crime & Delinquency 35, no. 
3 (July 1, 1989): 401–420, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128789035003006. 
8 Jeff Walsh, “Crime Stoppers,” in Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement, ed. Larry E. Sullivan et al., 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2018), 122–123, http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/lawenforcement. 
9 “About Us,” Crime Stoppers International, accessed April 7, 2018, https://csiworld.org/about-us. 
4 
in an increase in reported misconduct and corruption as compared to non-incentive driven 
crime reporting programs.10 
CBP might benefit from the adoption of incentive programs. The challenge is to 
determine whether existing approaches are scalable and how much modification they 
would require for the unique CBP environment. CBP is a federal law enforcement 
organization composed of approximately 60,000 employees with jurisdiction throughout 
the United States. CBP employees are represented by three different labor unions with 
whom negotiations to enact such approaches would be necessary. Labor unions do not 
affect the CBP mission or the integrity of CBP personnel. However, any change identified 
as a change in work environment or established past practice typically requires labor 
contract re-negotiation. Lastly, CBP has employees stationed throughout the world where 
U.S. laws may not apply. CBP employees stationed abroad must still follow CBP’s policies 
and procedures, but criminal statutes vary from country to country that can possibly hamper 
criminal prosecution or extradition for criminal acts committed outside the United States.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can CBP leverage successful non-cyber centric programs to detect and prevent 
corruption?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review focuses on information available regarding 
counterintelligence methods used to detect, deter, and mitigate insider threats within U.S. 
law enforcement and the intelligence community (IC), specifically within CBP. The review 
also uses information regarding human behavior and psychological markers indicative of 
insider threats. This review is of non-law enforcement sensitive and non-classified sources, 
government reports, professional journals, and books written by members of the IC and 
psychological experts.  
 
10 Stephen E. G. Lea and Paul Webley, “Money as Tool, Money as Drug: The Biological Psychology 
of a Strong Incentive,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences; New York 29, no. 2 (April 2006): 161–165, 
ProQuest. 
5 
1. Understanding Insider Threats 
Employees are a critical asset within an organization; however, employees who 
become insider threats present a significant risk to an agency’s mission and operations. An 
important question that must be asked regarding insider threats is “Why does an employee 
become an insider threat?” Michael Sulick, former head of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA’s) Directorate of Operations, argues that employees become insider threats 
for money, improvement of their self-image, revenge, romance, adventure, ideological 
sympathy, globalization resulting in conflicting allegiances, greed, or loyalty to a cause.11 
In this way, critical assets can be transformed into threats. Ceresola asserts that both 
structural and institutional factors and individual factors cause corruption.12 More 
transparent organizations are less prone to corruption and more restrictive organizations 
are more prone to corruption, where arguably the organizational structure determines if the 
organization is susceptible to corruption. Beyond the structure of the organization, some 
employees engage in corruption regardless of the structural influence. Employees who 
believe they are above the rules and believe the chances of being caught are low are more 
likely to engage in corruption.  
Traditional insider threat mitigation strategies typically employ negative incentives 
(disincentives) to compel employees to act in the best interests of the organization. 
Negative incentives range from infractions, sanctions, admonishments, to criminal charges. 
Research indicated that when relied on excessively, negative incentives could lower morale 
and cause unintended consequences. However, positive incentives foster employee 
cooperation through extrinsic (money) or intrinsic (dedication) measures to act in the best 
interest of the organization. Stated differently, employees who feel as though they have 
organizational support are more prone to report corrupt acts. 
 
11 Michael J. Sulick, American Spies: Espionage against the United States from the Cold War to the 
Present (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 7. 
12 Ryan G. Ceresola, “The U.S. Government’s Framing of Corruption: A Content Analysis of Public 
Integrity Section Reports, 1978–2013,” Crime, Law and Social Change; Dordrecht 71, no. 1 (February 
2019): 49, ProQuest. 
6 
An organization must prioritize the need to understand who poses an insider threat 
to conduct operations effectively. According to a RAND Corporation conference 
proceedings document, organizations must understand, define, and find methods to 
mitigate the risks associated with potential breaches of security.13 Per Greitzer et al., one 
method to mitigate insider threat risks is psychosocial models. They argue that 
psychosocial models that analyze behaviors associated with an increased risk of a person 
becoming an insider threat can identify certain traits exhibited by insider threats.14 Such 
psychosocial models define several risk indicators, such as disregard for authority, 
disgruntlement, and anger management issues, and assign each indicator a level or 
psychosocial risk. Cole and Ring contend that besides psychosocial tools, technology can 
identify warning signs through word use analysis.15 However, word use analysis requires 
the examination of computer keystrokes and word usage in analytical intelligence 
documents. Employees strictly engaged in law enforcement activities do not routinely 
create intelligence analysis documents. According to CBP, employees whose duties reside 
strictly in law enforcement write police and incident reports and rarely stray from those 
types of documents.16 Literature regarding state and local law enforcement officers either 
arrested or convicted of crimes does not yield any link to the release of intelligence 
documents nor list any CBP officers or agents either arrested or indicted for unauthorized 
disclosure of classified material.17 This situation gives CBP few tools to predict such 
warning signs.  
 
13 Richard C. Brackney and Robert H. Anderson, Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a 
March 2004 Workshop (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004). 
14 Frank L. Greitzer et al., “Psychosocial Modeling of Insider Threat Risk Based on Behavioral and 
Word Use Analysis,” e-Service Journal 9, no. 1 (2013): 106–138, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/548560/summary.  
15 Eric Cole and Sandra Ring, Insider Threat: Protecting the Enterprise from Sabotage, Spying, and 
Theft, 1st. ed. (Rockland, MA: Syngress, 2006), 209, 215. 
16 “Border Patrol Agent Duties,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, accessed November 27, 2017, 
https://www.cbp.gov/careers/frontline-careers/bpa/duties. 
17 Graham H. Turbiville, “Silver over the Border: U.S. Law Enforcement Corruption on the Southwest 
Border,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 5 (December 2011): 835–859, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2011.620811. 
7 
Scholars agree that understanding why a person engages in insider threat activity 
gives employers a proactive edge in identifying persons who display an increased 
psychosocial risk. As per CBP and Police Integrity Lost, arrests of local, state, and CBP 
law enforcement officers demonstrated that front line agents and officers do not typically 
create or handle classified intelligence reports.18 Strategies to identify insider threats 
proactively generally discuss IC personnel who create or handle classified information 
rather than front line law enforcement staff, despite the fact that the latter do handle and 
generate proprietary, personably identifiable, and law enforcement sensitive information.  
2. Defending against Insider Threats 
The goal of any agency or employer is proactively to identify and mitigate 
employees with intent to cause the agency harm. Lowenthal argues that to identify and 
mitigate such threats, the agency must develop methods and policies to defend against 
them.19 Employees already inside an agency have various reasons for engaging in insider 
threat activity. According to Catrantzos, different types of insider threats include the 
malicious insider, trust betrayer, infiltrator, recruited asset, and disgruntled employee.20 
While Catrantzos does focus on why actors either engage in corruption or espionage, the 
focus should rather be on the individuals, their positions in the organization, and how the 
actors obtained those positions (e.g., through infiltration, as a recruited asset).21 The 
literature discusses numerous methodologies—including but not limited to background 
checks, polygraphs, analytical software, and techniques used in the IC—available to 
employers to defend against insider threats.  
According to Dahl, intelligence gathering provides strategic level warning 
intelligence and mitigates insider attacks; however, warning intelligence is not necessarily 
 
18 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Final Report of the CBP Integrity, 8–11. 
19 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence; From Secrets to Policy, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2016), 239, 310. 
20 Nicholas Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners: Defending against Insider Threats to Critical Infrastructure” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 1, http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA508935. 
21 Catrantzos, 1–4. 
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the same as operational information.22 Grabo and Goldman state that warning intelligence 
can either provide information regarding imminent, immediate future, near future, and 
foreseeable attacks or threats but infrequently produces actionable intelligence.23 Grabo 
and Goldman assert that intelligence only provides decision makers with the best and 
earliest information to make an informed judgement that an action is hostile, and thus only 
provides tactical intelligence.24 Steps must be taken to create a tangible intelligence 
product. According to the Homeland Security Advisory Council Final Report of the CBP 
Integrity Advisory Panel, properly analyzed and processed warning intelligence will likely 
produce more than just information; the product provides actionable intelligence.25 
Researchers agree that when agencies obtain actionable intelligence, the agencies can 
defend their infrastructure and technology better.  
The “No Dark Corners” concept, an array of defenses to configure job roles to 
reduce the probability of a single person occupying a sensitive area undetected or without 
the possibility of being alone, discusses proactive measures that can be used to defend 
critical infrastructure.26 Corporate sentinels, random audits, background checks, and 
technologically based monitoring can be used to defend against insider threats.  
Literature available on the topic of defending against insider threats focuses on 
infrastructure and technology. The infrastructure and technology discussed in the literature 
are not typically available to law enforcement personnel on patrol. According to the House 
Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, it is 
challenging and costly to add improvements to infrastructure in remote areas or private 
 
22 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 21, 23. 
23 Cynthia Grabo and Jan Goldman, Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to 
National Security, 1st ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 2–3, 30. 
24 Grabo and Goldman, 2, 13. 
25 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Final Report of the CBP Integrity, 15–19. 
26 Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners,” 2. 
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property to deter insider threats.27 As per Catrantzos, infrastructure improvements to 
public service buildings and technology may not be as challenging.28 However, research 
into what infrastructure improvements to remote areas or private property may mitigate 
insider threats is important to this topic in CBP’s context because CBP employees routinely 
work in austere environments or on private property, such as ranches and farms.  
3. The Human Element in Insider Threat Detection and Mitigation  
Traditional IC methodologies and counterintelligence techniques play an important 
role in the literature. Infrastructure and technology employee monitoring are an important 
tool in detecting and mitigating insider threats.29 Not much discussion however has 
resulted concerning such tools used outdoors or across large geographic areas where 
supervisor contact is limited. 
According to Lowenthal, leveraging IC data collection and counterintelligence 
tactics can provide intelligence that detects and mitigates insider threats.30 Sims and 
Gerber argue that to leverage IC techniques and counterintelligence tactics, IC 
professionals must reinvent themselves to meet the demands of the ever-evolving threat.31 
An example of a non-traditional counterintelligence tactic is the NYPD’s VAP.32 The VAP 
unit recruits cadets while at the police academy to work their regular patrol duties and 
report corruption or misconduct to the IAB. 
 
27 Keeping Pace with Trade, Travel, and Security: How Does CBP Prioritize and Improve Staffing And 
Infrastructure?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, House of 
Representatives, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., April 19, 2016, 23–24, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
114hhrg22756/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg22756.pdf. 
28 Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners,” 2–5. 
29 Cole and Ring, Insider Threat, 42, 58. 
30 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 239, 310. 
31 Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 70, 97. 
32 Gary T. Marx, “When the Guards Guard Themselves: Undercover Tactics Turned Inward,” Policing 
and Society 2, no. 3 (April 1992): 151–172, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10439463.1992.9964639. 
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Cole and Ring argue that insider threat case studies and their findings will 
determine what technology and what processes work best in which environments.33 
Lowenthal reasons that the overall process of intelligence gathering, analysis, and 
dissemination, specifically the use of counterintelligence methods, and the external 
indicators and problems associated with counterintelligence operations, must be studied 
and understood.34 After managers and decision makers study and understand the IC, they 
will find it challenging to create counterintelligence policies to combat insider threats as 
no single method or process exists that is completely successful in all scenarios.  
4. IC and Counterintelligence Use to Combat Insider Threats within 
Customs and Border Protection 
No CBP insider threat programs, policies, or procedures proactively target insider 
threats. According to a GAO report for Congress, CBP conducts pre-employment 
polygraph exams, pre-employment background investigations, and periodic re-
investigations for employees in certain positions.35 No literature demonstrates a proactive 
approach to combat current employees engaged in insider threat activities other than typical 
IA investigations that investigate employees after an allegation is made against the 
particular employee. Reports and data regarding countrywide police officer arrests are 
available and provide a solid benchmark to determine why employees engage in corruption 
or misconduct (insider threats).  
5. Human Behavior and Psychological Markers 
Insider threat research began in the United States in the 1990s, and studies 
identified psychological markers that indicate an increased risk for damaging behavior.36 
Additional studies corroborated initial findings that persons who engage in retaliatory 
behavior, such as abusing sick leave, wasting material, or damaging equipment, are prone 
 
33 Cole and Ring, Insider Threat, 17. 
34 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 232. 
35 Government Accountability Office, Border Security, 3, 6. 
36 William R. Claycomb et al., Chronological Examination of Insider Threat Sabotage: Preliminary 
Observations (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 2012), 17.  
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to psychological breaches of contract.37 Puleo argues that persons engage in criminal acts 
because of greed, revenge, ideological differences, sympathy for a cause, and recognition 
of power indicating that reasons for criminal behavior derive from human emotions.38 The 
Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) notes that differences in ethical 
conventions originating from cultural differences may be the cause of conflict and 
misunderstanding between employees and staff with different cultural, ethnic, or political 
and social differences.39 Arguably, these ethical and cultural contextual differences can 
directly influence insider risk. To mitigate the risk, policies and practices should be 
modified as required by cultural settings; however, care must be taken not to confuse 
personnel and undermine the effectiveness of the policy.40  
Carnegie Mellon University computer emergency response team (CERT) and 
PERSEREC’s analysis of insider sabotage models identified stressful events, such as 
organizational sanctions as factors that increase the likelihood of sabotage or espionage.41 
Therefore, psychological, cultural, and political stressors are arguably influential factors 
that when combined with psychological markers increase the likelihood of a person 
becoming an insider threat.  
However, Greitzer et al. argue that no psychosocial evaluation methods can predict 
risks for insider threats and that any evaluation methods must be coupled with security 
techniques to achieve an effective security package.42 Hence, employee evaluation models 
are more effective in mitigating insider threats from materializing when partnered with 
 
37 Frank L. Greitzer et al., Identifying At-Risk Employees: A Behavioral Model for Predicting Potential 
Insider Threats, PNNL-19665 (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 2010), 2.3, 
http://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1000159-1JPnC7/.  
38 Anthony J. Puleo, “Mitigating Insider Threat Using Human Behavior Influence Models” (master’s 
thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2006), 121. 
39 Eric D. Shaw, Lynn F. Fischer, and Andrée E. Rose, Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit, Technical 
Report 09-02 (Monterey, CA: Department of Defense, 2009), 6, 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA563910. 
40 Shaw, Fischer, and Rose, 8. 
41 Claycomb et al., Chronological Examination of Insider Threat, 7. 
42 Greitzer et al., Identifying At-Risk Employees, 2.4. 
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additional security layers, such as security protocols and a better-trained workforce to 
report anomalous actions or behavior indicative of an insider threat. 
6. Leadership Acceptance of Counterintelligence Program  
According to Dahl, acceptance of a counterintelligence program by government 
officials is challenging to achieve.43 Government leaders do not like to fail and that can 
cause some to be risk averse. A risk management plan with the risks versus rewards of 
certain actions or inactions must be developed. As per a 2013 DHS, Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) report, the most concerning insider threat concerns are unauthorized use 
and disclosure of classified or unclassified information, critical information technology 
network interruption, and border security breaches through malfeasance or nonfeasance.44 
Personnel must receive clear and consistent messaging regarding their roles and 
responsibilities from managers and supervisors in CBP for mitigating insider threats. 
Policies and procedures are already in place within CBP to identify unauthorized access 
and disclosure of classified or unclassified information, as well as security to IT networks. 
Due to the sensitive nature of internal investigations, exact figures on the effectiveness are 
not available. Every CBP employee knows that all activity on CBP networks are tracked 
and analyzed for suspicious activity. The IT-based security safeguards are thus particularly 
effective. However, CBP employees can deliberately circumvent operational procedures to 
allow unauthorized persons or material to enter the United States without the use of CBP 
networks. CBP’s Standards of Conduct policy requires every CBP employee to report 
allegations of misconduct immediately. OPR conducts an in-depth analysis of subjects with 
frequent OPR contact to ensure illicit activity is not ongoing. Nevertheless, the lack of a 
plan, policy, or procedure in place to combat insider threats proactively who have not had 
any previous contact with OPR threatens CBP. Individuals who want to breach the gap in 
border security by facilitating the flow of terrorists, narcotics, or other undocumented 
individuals through the U.S. border, can proceed unencumbered. Studies and research must 
 
43 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 157. 
44 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Taken Steps to Address 
Insider Threat, but Challenges Remain, OIG-13-118 (Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 
2013), 6, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-118_Sep13.pdf. 
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be conducted to determine what, if any, IC methodologies can mitigate employee insider 
threats.  
7. Additional Literature 
Literature obtained from NYPD interviews and Crime Stoppers research facilitated 
the case study research and subsequent policy recommendations in this thesis.45 
Operational NYPD data including policy, policy implementation data, metrics, challenges, 
legal issues, and statistical data added to the overall policy plan. Crime Stoppers data 
regarding crime clearance rates, monetary returns, and incentive programs aided in crafting 
the dual-prong policy plan.46  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This research consists of two case studies, the NYPD VAP and the Crime Stoppers 
Program. This research identified and examined key structural, strategic, and operational 
elements of those programs. The research extracted the components and lessons applicable 
to CBP through replication or modification.  
The two programs are exceptional outlier cases.47 The VAP and Crime Stoppers 
programs were selected because of their innovative proactive approaches to mitigate crime 
and corruption. Both programs are large, established, and high profile enough to allow 
close and detailed study. An incentive program, such as the Crime Stoppers model, which 
allows employees to remain anonymous, has worked with civilians, and the framework 
may be used in the CBP environment. Implementing a Crime Stoppers-like program that 
allows employees to provide information anonymously to CBP’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) with a possible monetary incentive, should the information the 
anonymous employee provides lead either to an arrest or conviction, is a viable option.  
 
45 Jeffrey Liss, email message to author, February 7, 2018. 
46 “History,” Crime Stoppers USA, accessed March 29, 2021, 
https://www.crimestoppersusa.org/history/. 
47 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 
2013), 15. 
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Implementation of a policy creating a proactive program, such as the NYPD VAP 
is a viable option for CBP. The VAP is an exceptional program that consists of frontline 
police personnel who voluntarily provide information to personnel within NYPD’s IAB. 
The VAP is unique because participants work their regular assigned posts but also report 
findings of corruption to their assigned IAB handlers.  
VAP research relied on internal documents and sources with cooperation from an 
NYPD VAP supervisor and a senior investigator. Specifically, the NYPD shared 
information regarding the VAP creation, VAP design and structure, performance metrics, 
possible improvements, and challenges faced. The NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
determined that the interviews with NYPD VAP principals provided by email to the author 
did not warrant IRB approval. Crime Stoppers research relied on academic literature, 
program evaluations, legal briefs, and Crime Stoppers International documents.  
E. OVERVIEW  
Chapter II provides the reader with background information on the U.S. Customs 
Service (USCS), the predecessor to CBP. The chapter provides the reader with historical 
research of corruption and misconduct within the USCS and CBP. The chapter informs the 
reader of CBP new-employee vetting procedures and compares the CBP polygraph 
program to other federal agencies while reviewing the efficacy of the polygraph. 
Chapter III is a case study of the Crime Stoppers program and psychological 
research on incentive-based reporting studies and programs. Chapter III addresses social 
dilemma studies and explores whether incentive-based programs unknowingly drive 
people to report fictitious crimes to receive monetary incentives.  
Chapter IV is a case study of the NYPD’s VAP and psychological research into 
psychological markers that demonstrate whether a person is prone to commit criminal acts. 
Lastly, the chapter discusses whether peer reporting mitigates insider threats.  
Chapter V makes recommendations for a hybrid program that encompasses both an 
incentive-based reporting model and a peer-reporting model to mitigate corruption and 
misconduct. The chapter analyzes challenges and costs associated with implementation. It 
15 
also presents conclusions of a fully implemented carrot-and-stick hybrid program. The 
chapter summarizes the research and assesses the importance of the constant evolution 
required to ensure the program is successful. 
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II. MISCONDUCT IN CBP AND 
CURRENT MITIGATION STRATEGIES  
Like most large law enforcement entities, CBP suffers from employee misconduct, 
ranging from administrative policy violations to serious criminal acts. Pre-employment 
vetting and polygraph examinations decrease the chances of hiring persons with 
questionable backgrounds. However, once employed, methodologies to ensure employees 
continue to avoid and prevent misconduct would enhance the likelihood of deterrence or 
apprehension. Changing culture that accepts misconduct as an unavoidable aspect of law 
enforcement is a challenging endeavor but not an impossible task. Changing this culture 
begins with understanding the agency’s roots. This chapter presents the history of 
corruption within CBP, discusses vetting and backgrounds checks, and determines the 
historical effectiveness of pre- and post-employment polygraphs.  
The USCS was the first federal law enforcement agency created by the newly 
formed United States of America and established by the First Congress in 1789.48 
Unfortunately, corruption in USCS was present almost from its inception, and for almost 
100 years, appointments and promotions within USCS were made according to the “spoils 
system.”49 The spoils system doled out civil service positions according to political loyalty 
and favoritism, and prominent families and political supporters benefitted the most from 
it. Similarly, most early American police departments were infamously corrupt.50 The 
local political district head selected the local police administrator, which triggered 
effortless manipulation by the polity.51 The local district head generally controlled the 
gambling and prostitution, the local tavern, and local gangs, which thus resulted in having 
a foothold on policing and crime all at once.52 Regrettably, corruption and misconduct of 
 
48 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Vision and Strategy 2020, 6. 
49 “History,” U.S. Customs Museum Foundation, accessed August 8, 2017, 
http://customsmuseum.org/history/. 





U.S. law enforcement officers and agents continues to this day.53 CBP is no exception to 
rank-and-file misconduct and corruption. Regrettably, no national databases allow for the 
study, research, and analysis of either police corruption or crime.54 Nevertheless, this 
practice means it must be actively thwarted. 
A 2011 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) budget 
provided a succinct overview of the U.S. law enforcement corruption problem and its 
impact: 
Magnifying the problem is the documented presence of corrupt border 
officials who facilitate a wide range of illegal activities along the Southwest 
Border. Resource-rich cartels employ a variety of methods in order to target 
and recruit U.S. Border Patrol agents, Customs and Border Protection 
officers, and local police officers who can facilitate organized crime. The 
corrupt officials assist the cartels by providing intelligence and participating 
in moving weapons, drugs, aliens, and other contraband across the US-
Mexican border. Corruption within U.S. law enforcement, coupled with 
extensive corruption among Mexican government, military, and law 
enforcement officials, facilitates the operations of the cartels.55 
As previously mentioned, a 2012 GAO study indicated that CBP employees were 
reported and arrested  for misconduct, such as domestic violence or driving under the 
influence for fiscal years 2005 to 2012, and 144 former or current CBP employee were 
arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as smuggling aliens or drugs.56 
The majority of the allegations of corruption or misconduct against CBP employees 
occurred along the southwest border because this area represents a key transit route for 
undocumented migrants and illegal drugs.57 Arguably, the majority of corruption or 
misconduct allegations occur on the southwest border because a large majority of CBP 
employees is stationed along that area compared to the northern border.  
 
53 Philip Matthew Stinson et al., Police Integrity Lost: A Study of Law Enforcement Officers Arrested: 
Final Technical Report (Bowling Green, OH: Criminal Justice Program, Department of Human Services, 
College of Health & Human Services, Bowling Green State University, 2016). 
54 Stinson et al., 14. 
55 Turbiville, “Silver over the Border,” 835–859. 
56 Government Accountability Office, Border Security, 2. 
57 Government Accountability Office, 2.  
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In 2016, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 
released a National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy to highlight the most 
important issues in U.S. policy.58 The strategy addresses corruption along the southwest 
border and requires agencies to report corruption to the FBI’s Border Corruption Task 
Force. Namely, the strategy increases the focus on connections between public corruption 
and threats to U.S. national security. The involvement of the ONDCP demonstrates the 
importance of combatting criminal corruption and misconduct along the southwest border. 
A. CRIMINAL CORRUPTION IN CBP 
CBP law enforcement officers and agents enforce hundreds of U.S. laws and 
regulations. CBP’s main task is to keep terrorists and their weapons out of the United States 
while facilitating lawful trade and travel. CBP law enforcement personnel include CBP 
officers (CBPOs), border patrol agents (BPAs), and air and marine officers (AMOs). 
CBPOs work at official POEs in and around the country. BPAs work between the POEs. 
BPAs detect and apprehend persons and illicit goods illegally entering the country between 
the POEs. AMOs include pilots and boat operators who work in concert with BPAs to 
apprehend persons and illicit goods illegally entering the country. The three types of CBP 
law enforcement personnel work in different environments. Each environment provides 
unique opportunities for corrupt employees either to allow items or individuals to enter the 
country without inspection. For example, a CBPO may allow a vehicle to enter the country 
without proper inspection while not triggering any IT safeguards by simply not inspecting 
the passengers in that vehicle. BPAs patrolling in an austere desert may allow persons 
carrying narcotics by not patrolling their assigned areas. Lastly, AMO personnel on patrol 
in the maritime environment may allow a boatload of narcotics to pass by avoiding an 
established smuggling route. Even though these are hypothetical scenarios, a corrupt 
employee can easily allow items or persons to enter without drawing either much suspicion 
from peers or supervisors. 
 
58 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Southwest Border Counternarcotics 




All federal law enforcement agents and officers undergo background and vetting 
procedures that disqualify persons with questionable backgrounds or criminal history. 
Although these background checks and vetting generally disqualify persons not fit for 
employment as federal law enforcement officers, some may slip through the cracks. 
Research and analysis in this thesis demonstrates a corrupt employee does not just take a 
single path to criminalization. Some employees begin their careers with no intention to 
commit criminal acts but are somehow corrupted along the way. Some employees are 
infiltrators who enter into law enforcement with the intent to cause harm for nefarious 
reasons. Failures in employee vetting, non-reporting by peers, and lack of on–the-job-
supervision are some contributing factors. Arguably, no pre-employment vetting system is 
foolproof.  
To combat corruption and misconduct, CBP implemented pre-employment 
polygraph examinations in 2008. CBP randomly polygraphed law enforcement candidates 
from 2008 to 2013. However, only approximately 25 percent of the new employee 
candidate pool received a polygraph examination.59 CBP uses a full-scope polygraph 
combining lifestyle, national security, and counterintelligence questions. 
CBP candidates who did not receive a polygraph examination underwent a single 
scope background investigation (SSBI). CBP still has several thousand employees who 
never received a polygraph. Those hired before 2008 did not receive a polygraph and only 
a small percentage of the employees hired from 2008 to 2013 received one.  
Due to the national security position held by CBP law enforcement officers and 
agents, corruption within its ranks can have devastating outcomes. A corrupt CBP 
employee turning a blind eye might theoretically allow terrorists or terrorist weapons into 
the country that could have a devastating impact deep in the interior of the country. CBPOs 
and BPAs have allowed either persons or items into the country in exchange for money, 
sex, or drugs. No one really knows what these corrupt employees allowed into the United 
States because the employees themselves do not know what they allowed to enter. High 
profile CBP corruption cases bring this concern to light. The significant cases that follow 
 
59 Author was assigned to CBP HQ at the time the CBP polygraph program was implemented. 
21 
highlight criminal corruption within CBP ranging from an employee whose goal was to 
work with a smuggling organization when he applied to join CBP, to employees who for 
an unknown reason engaged in criminal activity after several years of service in CBP.  
1. Some Examples of Corrupt CBP Employees 
• In 2009, CBPO Luis F. Alarid, who worked in San Diego, California, was 
convicted for allowing drugs and illegal immigrants through his inspection 
lane at a POE.60 Alarid earned over $200,000 for his illicit acts. 
Investigators involved in the case believed that Alarid planned to work for 
smugglers when he applied to join CBP.61  
• In February 2016, Douglas, Arizona POE employee, CBPO Johnny 
Acosta, received an eight-year prison sentence for bribery and drug 
smuggling.62 Authorities arrested Acosta attempting to flee into Mexico. 
Acosta accepted over $70,000 in bribes and allowed over a ton of 
marijuana into the United States.  
• In January 2016, Supervisory BPA Eduardo Bazan, who worked in 
McAllen, Texas, was accused of assisting a drug organization in 
smuggling cocaine.63 Bazan admitted to receiving over $8,000 to help the 
drug smuggling organization.  
• In 2017, BPA Joel Luna, who worked in Hebbronville, Texas, was 
charged with murder and engaging in organized criminal activity.64 Luna 
 
60 Randal C. Archibold, “Mexican Cartels Look to Turn Border Agents—With Some Success,” New 
York Times, sec. U.S., December 17, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/us/18corrupt.html. 
61 Archibold. 
62 Ron Nixon, “The Enemy within: Bribes Bore a Hole in the U.S. Border,” New York Times, sec. U.S., 
December 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/us/homeland-security-border-bribes.html. 
63 Nixon. 
64 Jeremy Raff, “The Border Patrol’s Corruption Problem,” The Atlantic, May 5, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/not-one-bad-apple/525327/. 
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was acquitted of the murder charge but was convicted on two counts of 
engaging in organized criminal activity.  
Review of records demonstrates that employees were either charged or convicted 
of corruption vary in years of service. Of the CBP employees either arrested or convicted 
for acts of corruption between 2004 and 2015, 49 had five years or less of service, 43 had 
six to 10 years of service, 30 had 11 to 19 years of service, 11 had 20 years or more of 
service, and seven had an unknown number of years in service.65 The pattern demonstrates 
that a large number of employees convicted of corruption did not undergo pre-employment 
polygraph examinations because they were not required at the time of their employment. 
Research into misconduct and criminality rates specifically for employees hired after 
mandatory pre-employment polygraphs is not available. Even though a polygraph or 
periodic re-investigation cannot predict whether a person will become corrupt after 
employment, an analysis of agencies within the Department of Justice (DOJ) discussed 
later does show a correlation between lower corruption rates and pre- and post-employment 
polygraphs.  
2. Status Quo—Current CBP Law Enforcement Employee Vetting 
Process 
All CBP law enforcement employees hired after 2013 must pass an SSBI and a 
polygraph. Though an SSBI qualifies CBP employees for security clearances, the general 
uniformed CBP workforce carries only a law enforcement sensitive clearance; specialty, 
plain clothes (non-uniformed), and intelligence units are generally granted a secret or top-
secret clearance. Due to the sensitive nature of this information, exact numbers of CBP 
employees with security clearances are not available.  
A typical five-year periodic re-investigation consists of criminal records checks, 
credit bureau reports, commercial databases containing public civil records, foreign travel 
databases, and co-worker interviews. CBP does not use any other proactive screening tool 
to mitigate the risk of incumbent employee corruption and misconduct.  
 
65 “Cracks in the Wall: When Border Watchdogs Turn Criminal,” The Texas Tribune, July 7, 2016, 
https://apps.texastribune.org/bordering-on-insecurity/when-border-watchdogs-turn-criminal/. 
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Nevertheless, undergoing a pre-employment background check does not mean the 
check itself was completed. From 2008 to the writing of this thesis, 22 Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) background investigators and two record inspectors were convicted 
of falsifying reports of investigation.66 The background investigators generated false 
reports indicating they interviewed references, reviewed sources, and records regarding the 
subjects of the investigations. However, the background investigators did not conduct the 
interviews or obtain the records. The agencies requesting the background investigations 
used and relied upon the false reports generated by the background investigators for 
employment and security clearance purposes. Positions filled with the incomplete or false 
investigative background checks included positions with access to classified information, 
national security, and positions of public trust.67 The convictions were a stark reminder 
that simply having a completed SSBI does not guarantee an applicant was properly vetted 
prior to employment and demonstrated a need for an ongoing vetting process.  
To guarantee an ongoing vetting process within CBP, the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council (HSAC) Final Report of the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel 
recommended the expansion of the CBP polygraph program to include targeted and 
random post-employment polygraphs.68 The HSAC report suggests ongoing monitoring:  
We believe that integrity could be enhanced further by periodic random and 
targeted polygraph examinations on a post-hire basis of CBP law 
enforcement personnel. The FBI and the agencies in the U.S. intelligence 
community (e.g., CIA, DIA, NSA) currently conduct post-hire polygraphs 
during their 5-year periodic security investigation and some random 
polygraphs for on-board employees.69 
In keeping with this sentiment, a bill introduced in July 2017 titled, “Integrity in 
Border and Immigration Enforcement Act” requires CBP to administer post-employment 
 
66 “Former Background Investigator for Federal Government Pleads Guilty to Making a False 
Statement,” Department of Justice, accessed August 11, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/former-
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67 Department of Justice. 
68 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Final Report of the CBP Integrity, 19. 
69 Homeland Security Advisory Council, 19. 
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polygraphs to law enforcement personnel.70 To date, the bill has passed in neither the 
Senate nor the House and has not become law.71 It is unknown why the bill has not passed 
the Senate or the House and become law. Thus, incumbent CBP employees do not receive 
a post-hire polygraph examination and only undergo a periodic re-investigation every five 
years of employment. As discussed later in this thesis, post-hire polygraph examinations 
will not completely eliminate corruption or misconduct. However, the research indicated 
that agencies within the DOJ that require incumbent polygraph tests reported less 
corruption cases than CBP.  
3. Other Agencies that Employ Polygraph Testing 
Components within the DOJ conduct polygraph examinations for a variety of 
reasons. The components use polygraphs during pre-employment and personnel security 
vetting to investigate criminal, administrative (IA and misconduct), and security violations, 
ensure witness security, and provide sex offender treatment, foreign counterintelligence 
and counterterrorism investigations, as well as operational support in examining or vetting 
foreign task force members and validating intelligence sources.72 Thus, the DOJ uses 
polygraphs to find a host of problems. 
A 2006 DOJ/OIG documented the four DOJ components that operate their own 
polygraph programs and administer post-employment polygraph tests during misconduct 
investigations.73 The four components are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF), and the DOJ/OIG. “From FY 2002 through 2005, the four polygraph 
units conducted 149 specific-issue polygraph examinations of employees who were 
subjects, witnesses, or complainants in investigations of personal misconduct in the 
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performance of their official duties.”74 In contrast, CBP reported 2,170 misconduct cases 
from 2005 to 2012.75 If CBP administered specific-issue polygraphs for only 10 percent 
of its reported misconduct cases during the aforementioned period, the 217 hypothetical 
polygraphs would be greater than the 149 polygraphs conducted by the four DOJ 
components combined. It must be considered that CBP is a larger organization than the 
four DOJ agencies individually, but combined, the four components have a larger 
workforce than CBP. The aforementioned polygraph data demonstrates that not all federal 
law enforcement organizations that also work along the U.S.-Mexico border have the same 
documented levels of misconduct and corruption as CBP. Further research into the 
correlation between post-employment polygraphs and misconduct investigations is 
necessary to determine if the mere possibility of a post-employment polygraph reduces 
misconduct.  
Even if incumbent periodic or random polygraph testing were instituted in CBP, it 
would not guarantee that employees engaging in misconduct or corruption would show 
deception during testing that would have resulted in a positive polygraph exam. Several 
documented cases show federal employees or law enforcement officers or agents having 
taken polygraph exams and passed even while engaging in nefarious activities. One of the 
most famous cases was Aldrich Ames, a CIA employee who was arrested for selling 
classified information to the Russians. During his time as a spy, Ames successfully passed 
two polygraph exams that specifically targeted the activities he engaged in as a spy.76  
4. Issues and Problems—Pros and Cons to Polygraph Examinations 
As a deception detection tool, much debate surrounds the accuracy of polygraphs. 
A polygraph device is a diagnostic tool able to measure physiological responses indicative 
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of deception.77 The physiological responses are a result of psychological arousals during 
a state of lying or untruthfulness (deception).78 Deception is defined as a deliberate attempt 
to create a false belief in others.79 Proponents of the polygraph exam argue that polygraphs 
are approximately 80 to 98 percent accurate.80 Opponents argue that polygraphs are 
approximately 60 percent accurate, or only slightly better than flipping a coin.81 Judging 
which side is “correct” is not so easy.  
Research confirms that a polygraph device measures physiological reactions that 
may be associated with stress, fear, guilt, anger, excitement, or anxiety about detection, 
regardless of an examinee’s guilt or innocence.82 Regardless of beliefs, the polygraph’s 
utility remains. Some of the polygraph’s effectiveness may be linked to examinees’ 
expectations where the examinees confess to misconduct or corruption because of their 
belief in the power of the exam.  
CBP pre-employment examinees admitted to a wide range of illicit activity during 
their polygraph examinations. Examinees admitted to seeking a job with CBP simply to 
commit crimes. Other examinees admitted to being involved in drug smuggling or 
excessive use of illegal drugs. One applicant admitted that a drug smuggler, who was also 
his brother-in-law, asked him to gain employment with CBP and assist him with cocaine 
smuggling.83 A different applicant admitted he used marijuana 9,000 times, to include the 
night before his polygraph.84 The same applicant admitted to using cocaine 30 to 40 times, 
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using hallucinogenic mushrooms on 15 occasions, and using ecstasy approximately 50 
times.85 In this sense, polygraphs have a positive role in the screening process.  
Admission during pre-employment polygraph testing underscores the importance 
of polygraph examinations to ensure persons with a history of illicit activity looking to gain 
employment simply to commit crimes are removed from the CBP applicant pool. The 
polygraph is an important investigative tool used to verify whether applicants were 
untruthful, omitted information, or blatantly lied to background investigators regarding 
their criminal history, involvement in illicit activity, or disciplinary issues with previous 
employers.86 However, polygraph examinations for incumbent employees are reactive and 
not proactive. Even as proposed by the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010, it only 
requires polygraph examinations during the employee’s five-year periodic reinvestigation. 
Therefore, if an employee engages in corruption immediately after a periodic 
reinvestigation, the employee arguably has five years to engage in illicit activities and act 
unhindered until the next polygraph examination.  
Conversely, challenges exist with expanding CBP’s polygraph program. The first 
challenge with implementing such a program is CBP’s bargaining units. CBP’s bargaining 
units are comprised of the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC) and the National 
Treasury Employee Union (NTEU). Even though the unions cannot affect the agency’s 
security operations, negotiating is required when an employee’s established working 
conditions are changed. Since most uniformed CBP employees do not hold a secret or top-
secret security clearance, they are eligible to become union members. Therefore, a new 
procedure, such as adding a polygraph exam to a periodic re-investigation, generally 
requires negotiation with the bargaining units either unless or until the Anti-Border 
Corruption Act of 2010 is enacted into law. Contract negotiations with the NBPC and 
NTEU will more than likely be tedious, lengthy, and expensive, which makes incumbent 
polygraph examinations an undesirable option.  
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The second challenge is the size of the CBP polygraph unit. CBP does not have the 
number of polygraph examiners necessary to continue 100 percent pre-employment testing 
and begin testing incumbent employees. CBP would have to hire enough polygraph 
examiners to conduct both pre-employment and incumbent testing, but that is prohibitively 
expensive because of additional salary requirements, polygraph equipment for new 
examiners, either negotiation or modification to existing union contracts, and either added 
office workspace or testing locations.87 Therefore, depending solely on periodic polygraph 
examinations as the only proactive anticorruption mitigation strategy is unsound.  
B. PATH FORWARD  
Evidence has demonstrated that criminal corruption and misconduct within the 
CBP ranks pose a threat to the homeland security enterprise. The American public deserves 
a border agency free of corrupt officers and agents because the country relies on the 
legitimate trade and travel facilitated by CBP. CBP steps to mitigate criminal corruption 
and misconduct within its ranks include implementing pre-employment polygraph 
examinations, ensuring five-year incumbent employee reinvestigations are completed in a 
timely manner, and hiring more professional responsibility (IA) criminal investigators. 
These implementations highlight the threats posed by compromised CBP officers and 
agents in both front line and management positions. In the past, Americans envisioned 
border security personnel as hard working, understaffed, and under-resourced federal 
agents working diligently to combat drug trafficking and alien smuggling organizations.  
Despite improvements in the hiring process, CBP still faces challenges with 
incumbent employee corruption and misconduct. Currently, the only proactive tools 
available to CBP to screen incumbent employees are periodic five-year reinvestigations 
and random drug testing. However, CBP randomly drug tests only 10 percent of employees 
in designated law enforcement positions.88 Even though a positive drug test does not 
indicate corruption, it does indicate potential egregious misconduct. A continuous 
proactive approach combatting corruption and misconduct that does not require a five-year 
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hiatus between screenings is necessary. Implementing an ongoing proactive all-
encompassing approach provides a better opportunity to mitigate corruption and 
misconduct within the CBP ranks.  
Tools are available to monitor employee behavior and conduct continually. Two 
exceptional programs studied in this thesis are the Crime Stoppers model and the NYPD 
VAP. The Crime Stoppers program monetarily rewards persons who provide information 
to law enforcement that leads to the arrest and prosecution of criminals. The VAP is 
comprised of front line employees who observe and report corruption and misconduct to 
IA investigators. VAP participants leverage their unfettered access to the frontline 
workforce to provide information to IA. The combination of these two exceptional 
programs follows a motivation theory known as the carrot and stick approach. The carrot 
and stick approach is a motivational theory that elicits desired behaviors or induces 
cooperation by providing either incentives (rewards) or punishment.89 The following 
chapters discuss each program in depth.  
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III. CASE STUDY A: CRIME STOPPERS  
This chapter examines the aspects of the Crime Stoppers program including its 
benefits and possible drawbacks to derive lessons learned for CBP. Crime Stoppers was 
examined because it is an incentive program that encourages persons to report crime while 
allowing them to maintain anonymity. The chapter also argues that offering incentives to 
report crimes is an effective tool that has been used for centuries all around the world and 
still used to this day in the United States, such as the False Claims Act and programs 
instituted by the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities Exchange Commission.90 
Offering rewards or some type of compensation for information on crimes committed 
against a person or a business is as old as written history.  
Money has a value beyond being an exchange of value, but for symbolic reasons. 
Tool theory argues that humans see money as a “tool” in a metaphorical sense and will use 
time and effort to collect such a “tool.”91 Explained differently, humans are the only 
species that incentivizes obtaining modern objects, such as televisions, newspapers, books, 
etc. Humans obtain those items not because they are necessary to survival, but also for their 
informational value. Therefore, money when thought of as a tool is a means to increase 
knowledge by gathering information about the environment, which humans use to their 
benefit. Information allows people to exchange resources efficiently and is a means to an 
end. Tool theory also argues that money can be used as a social display, for social 
communication, and social protection extending the range of this “tool.”92 In addition to 
using money as a tool, research finds that having money makes humans feel strong and 
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self-sufficient.93 A stronger and more self-sufficient person will arguably allow for more 
personal growth and better decision making.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Crime Stoppers organization did not begin as an organization that offered 
money for information, but because of public reluctance to provide information about 
crimes for a variety of reasons, the organization quickly came to offer money in exchange 
for information. Police Officer Greg MacAleese of Albuquerque, New Mexico founded 
Crime Stoppers in 1976.94 Officer MacAleese’s program was not the first program to offer 
monetary incentives and anonymity for information regarding crimes, but it was the first 
to feature the media in a central role.95 
Crime Stoppers came into existence when officer MacAleese was investigating the 
homicide of Michael Carmen, a gas station attendant. Six weeks after the crime, he was 
frustrated and had few leads. Officer McAleese contacted a local television manager and 
proposed that the station air a reenactment of the crime during a newscast; the television 
manager agreed and broadcasted the first Crime Stoppers spotlight.96 After this 
reenactment on the nightly news, a witness called the police department and provided 
information that led to the apprehension of the two subjects responsible for Carmen’s 
murder.97 McAleese determined that people were reluctant to provide information 
regarding criminal events due to fear or apathy. Due to McAleese’s concerns, he 
determined one of Crime Stoppers’ tenets would be the reporting party’s secrecy and 
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anonymity.98 Another key portion of program was to offer monetary rewards if the 
information provided led to an arrest.99 
Crime Stoppers as structured now, is a private, non-profit organization. Citizens are 
responsible for creating a local Crime Stoppers chapter in accordance with Crime Stoppers 
International policies and directives.100 Each local Crime Stoppers organization votes on 
a board of directors responsible for fundraising, volunteer services, media relations, and 
law enforcement collaboration.101 The local board of directors selects volunteers to roles 
required for the organization to function, such as media relations, community relations, call 
takers, and a law enforcement coordinator.102 No publicly available data on required 
training for volunteer roles was located other than information regarding call takers’ 
requirement to ensure confidentiality and caller anonymity.  
Community members anonymously report information regarding crimes through a 
website on the local Crime Stoppers site or through local or toll-free phone numbers.103 
No personal information is collected from the tipster. The operator gives the tipster a code 
number to ensure anonymity and to differentiate different tipsters should several leads 
come in.104 The code number is auto-generated if the tipster uses a local website to provide 
information or a locally generated mobile phone application.105 The secure code number 
is used for the tipster to receive payment should an arrest occur based on the tipster’s 
information.  
Reward sizes are based on a point system. Points vary by the type of crime solved, 
the number of times the reporting party has provided valid information, the number of 
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persons arrested for that crime, and the value of any recovered or seized items.106 
Additional funds may be available for particular crimes based on donations or rewards 
offered by other parties for that specific crime.107 Crime Stoppers focuses on felony crimes 
and fugitive felons; however, the local board of directors may authorize payment for non-
felony crimes.108 
According to Crime Stoppers International, the Crime Stoppers program is active 
in 26 countries in North and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, Africa, and the 
Southern and West Pacific region.109 Crime Stoppers accepts information regarding 
fugitive criminals, human trafficking, cybercrime, illicit trade, and environmental 
crime.110 As per Crime Stoppers International, cumulative statistics are as follows: 
965,163 arrests made, 1,501,776 cases cleared, $2,122,776,681 in property recovered, and 
$8,976,384,548 in drugs seized.111 The information provided by Crime Stoppers 
International is staggering; however, no metric determines how many tipsters contact 
Crime Stoppers per successful outcome to provide a more nuanced indicator of efficacy. 
Since Crime Stoppers only shares cumulative statistics, it is not possible to compare their 
efficacy or clearance rate to law enforcement databases that keep statistical information on 
crimes committed versus crimes solved. 
B. TENETS 
The Crime Stoppers model was innovative at the time because it was the first 
program of its kind to use the media to air reenactments of specific cases, allow the 
reporting party to remain anonymous, and offer cash rewards for information leading to an 
arrest. Crime Stoppers has several tenets that make the program successful. The first tenet 
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is anonymity.112 Why do people fail to report crime? Witnesses and victims themselves 
fail to report crime because of fear, feelings of powerlessness, and concern of further 
victimization.113 The most common reason victims do not report crime because they 
believe the crime did not warrant police intervention, but others do not report crimes 
because they fear the police themselves.114 Crime Stoppers anonymity was a novel 
approach because it severs the link between the caller and the police and thereby eliminates 
any fears of retribution should the criminal face arrest and incarceration. By allowing all 
reporting parties to remain anonymous, Crime Stoppers also removes the stigma of 
“snitching” and the fear associated with providing information directly to law enforcement. 
Crime Stoppers does not make caller data available. It is unknown whether some callers 
are anonymous callers who provide no information to this confidential program; all callers 
are given an identification number that does not contain any personal information should 
they wish to claim a reward. 
The second tenet is protection against reprisals associated with whistleblowing.115 
A whistleblower does not have the protection of anonymity. Whistleblowers must follow 
strict procedures and channel complaints through certain oversight mechanisms merely to 
remain “confidential” without any guarantee that they will remain completely 
anonymous.116 Research demonstrates that employees in the private sector believe that 
reporting misconduct or corruption to superiors will cause harm to their professional 
lives.117 When reporting parties provide information to Crime Stoppers, that party does 
not need to provide the personal information required of a whistleblower. Therefore, the 
reporting party does not fear reprisals from employers or the criminal element.  
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The third tenet is promoting anonymous reporting through incentives, such as 
monetary rewards.118 Ordinarily, reporting a crime to law enforcement was seen as an 
ethical and moral responsibility. Specifically, a person’s conscience was considered the 
driving force to reporting criminal activity or wrongdoing in the workplace. However, as 
previously discussed, the fear of retribution, further victimization, or reprisal from an 
employer constrains people from reporting after witnessing crimes or misconduct in the 
workplace.119 Balliet et al. indicated that incentives for cooperation encourage people to 
sacrifice their self-interest, such as fear of reprisal for the collective benefit.120 Therefore, 
by offering monetary rewards for information leading to either the apprehension, arrest, or 
conviction of persons accused of committing a crime, Crime Stoppers mitigates a reporting 
party’s fear of reprisal.  
C. PROGRAM SCOPE 
Crime Stoppers is a non-profit organization overseen by a supervisory board 
nominated from each of its seven regions.121 The seven regions include the United States, 
Canada, the Caribbean, Bermuda, Latin America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, the 
Pacific, and Africa.122 Three sub-committees are governance, finance and risk, and 
communications and marketing to support the supervisory board.123 An advisory council 
comprised of subject matter experts and leaders from the law enforcement community, 
legal experts, corporate experts, and academia support the supervisory board and support 
collaborative efforts.124 Crime Stoppers collaborates with stakeholders, such as 
governments, international agencies, global corporations, law enforcement entities, and the 
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media to bring awareness of either crimes or criminal activity and to garner financial 
support for rewarding tipsters.125 This complex organizational structure demonstrates that 
a crime reporting mechanism works despite governmental, geographic, and cultural 
differences. 
As a worldwide brand, Crime Stoppers is arguably recognized globally in the seven 
regions in which it operates. The media provide Crime Stoppers information on crime and 
criminal events to the public free of charge.126 Due to Crime Stoppers’ relationship with 
the media through local news broadcasts, print, and web-based, the program reaches many 
viewers of locally syndicated news programs. Finally, due to collaboration with law 
enforcement entities, the general public has a trusted anonymous gateway to report crimes. 
It is common to watch a local news program with a Crime Stoppers segment regarding a 
recent crime offering a reward for information leading to a suspect’s arrest and conviction 
with the ever-important tenet of anonymity. Before Crime Stoppers, no record of a 
concerted effort existed to provide information on crimes to the general public using news 
broadcasts with a guarantee that the caller’s identity would remain anonymous and the 
possibility of a reward.  
D. PROGRAM EFFICACY 
Crime Stopper tenets hold that anonymity and incentives in the form of money 
encourage citizen participation in fighting crime. Crime Stoppers proponents tout the 
expansion of the program into a worldwide operation as proof of the program’s success. 
Nonetheless, opponents of the Crime Stoppers program argue that anonymity and 
incentives promote false reporting. Research indicates that Crime Stoppers is successful at 
solving violent crimes and property crimes.127 However, opponents argue that the measure 
of Crime Stoppers’ success rate is cumulative and not a true indicator of the program’s 
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effectiveness.128 Cumulative success rate shows the program’s effectiveness over a period 
of time, but it does not show its effectiveness on the clearance rates of crimes reported 
versus crimes solved. It is difficult to argue that a crime-fighting program that has been in 
existence since 1976 has not led to the apprehension of criminals and returned property to 
its rightful owners. Skeptics question whether rewarding reporting parties is the most 
effective method to garner public participation.129 Arguably, providing an incentive to 
report crime may lead to false reports to receive a reward. Thus, the role of incentives for 
reporting crime remains contentious. 
Debatably, the Crime Stoppers model is successful because of the anonymity and 
monetary incentives the program offers. Nevertheless, the power of money as an incentive 
and psychological tool also plays a role in why people choose to report crime. Analysis of 
rewards and incentives in social dilemmas proves that incentives can and do have positive 
physical and psychological effects. As discussed earlier, money is a psychological tool that 
confers feelings of self-worth and self-sufficiency.130 Lea and Webley argue that 
sociobiological traits lead people to perform a certain act because it confers a selective 
advantage; these acts conferred a selective advantage in the developmental stages of early 
homo sapiens, or because the tendency of such an act is a by-product of another tendency 
that does or did at some time confer an advantage.131 Following this train of thought, if 
reporting crime via Crime Stoppers allows for an incentive, the act confers the advantage 
of receiving money. Studies performed by Vohs, Mead, and Goode demonstrated that 
money enables people to achieve goals without help from others.132 The studies found that 
persons worked for longer periods before requesting assistance when they were reminded 
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of possible monetary rewards.133 Research by Zhou, Vohs, and Baumeister found that 
physical pain can be decreased by merely thinking about money, and that money gives 
people the ability to deal with setbacks, as well as fulfil their needs because money has the 
ability to function as a societal resource.134 
However, monetary rewards do not always yield positive results. For example, 
monetary rewards could be counterproductive and counterintuitive to human nature and 
create negative outcomes when rewards are not seen as commensurate to the task.135 In 
other words, if a monetary reward is offered for reporting misconduct, but the reward is 
seen as trivial or inconsequential, the reporting party is less likely to report misconduct in 
the future. Research regarding the detrimental effects of reward-based systems argues both 
for and against the system. Eisenberger and Cameron argue the following:  
Our examination of the research literature revealed that (a) detrimental 
effects of reward occur under highly restricted, easily avoidable conditions; 
(b) mechanisms of instrumental and classical conditioning are basic for 
understanding incremental and decremental effects of reward on task 
motivation; and (c) positive effects of reward on generalized creativity are 
easily attainable using procedures derived from behavior theory.136  
In social dilemma studies, incentives undermined autonomy, the motivation to 
cooperate, and rejection of the incentive.137 However, the same studies found that 
manipulation to incentive structures reduced self-interest and can promote higher rates of 
cooperation.138 Therefore, changing the incentive structure to suit the reporting party 
(increase in monetary reward, adherence to local customs, etc.) will promote more 
cooperation. Likewise, Drug Theory argues that even though money is a metaphorical tool 
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(Tool Theory), because of the psychological and physical effects money has on a person, 
it can also be seen as a drug.139 Debatably, a drug addiction may lead to negative effects, 
such as lying, stealing, and dishonesty without the proper treatment. Therefore, the 
synthesis of the research indicates that incentives are positive tools, and that any negative 
effects the incentives may have can be avoided by using proven psychological theories, 
such as behavior, tool, and drug theories.  
Crime Stoppers appears to be an effective tool in allowing the general public to 
provide information to law enforcement entities. Can the Crime Stoppers model mitigate 
corruption or insider threats within the law enforcement environment? Traditional insider 
threat mitigation strategies employ disincentives to compel employees to act in the best 
interests of the organization. However, when relied on excessively, disincentives can lower 
morale and cause unintended consequences because employees only expect negative 
outcomes for their actions. Positive incentives, such as the Crime Stoppers model 
encourages employees by extrinsically, through rewards, or intrinsically, by fostering 
commitment, to act in the best interests of the organization. Although research regarding 
active incentive programs in law enforcement organizations is not publicly available, 
research does exist regarding incentive programs targeting the mitigation of corruption.  
Empirical studies demonstrate that officials refrain from reporting people 
attempting to bribe them because of a lack of evidence, a lack of protection, personal 
disconnection, or a fear of negative repercussions.140 Bone and Spengler argue that 
employees will not report attempted bribes without a reward (or an insufficiently large 
reward) and that employees will report an attempted bribe if the reward for reporting was 
greater than the simplicity of merely not reporting the attempted bribe.141 Bone and 
Spengler’s study conducted studies where participants played the role of an inspector 
where the inspector had the opportunity to report an attempted bribery or merely ignore the 
attempted bribe. They found that when the reporting mechanism was cumbersome and time 
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consuming, the inspectors were less likely to report the attempted bribe. Conversely, they 
found that as the reporting becomes more profitable, the inspectors were more likely to 
report the attempted bribe. Moore et al. argue that employees who feel engaged, have 
organizational support, and feel connected at work, are more prone to report corruption.142 
Moore’s study suggests that negative incentives (punishment) that force employees to act 
in the interest of the organization do not increase the likelihood that an employee will report 
corruption. Positive reinforcements, on the other hand, encourage employees to act in the 
interest of the organization extrinsically (with incentives) or intrinsically (fostering a sense 
of commitment). That is not to say that officials will not report corruption or misconduct 
without incentives. A study of the Philadelphia Police Department found that survey 
respondents stated they were more prone to report misconduct when the corrupt act had a 
deep negative ethical impact.143 However, the study also found that officers lacked 
consensus regarding their personal code of ethics and the ethical violations the officers 
perceived as trivial.144 Furthermore, corrupt officers generally blame the system for their 
cynicism and misconduct.145 Therefore, employees arguably require a prompt or push to 
report misconduct especially with a lack of consensus of what is a reportable offense. 
Incentive programs provide that prompt or push. 
Recommendations to reduce employee theft and misconduct generally include the 
following tenets: screen potential employees, create an ethical organizational culture, 
remove temptations, and punish theft and reward honesty.146 Literature on employee theft 
identifies deviant behavior (clinical psychology), poor employee screening (industrial 
psychology), vices, such as gambling (criminology), inadequate security controls 
(security), and work group norms (organizational science), as some of the causes of either 
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employee corruption or misconduct.147 However, literature does not provide insight into 
how misconduct can be entirely prevented. 
Social psychology research indicates that those who give rewards are viewed more 
favorably than those who punish.148 Arguably, if employees view their employers in a 
positive light, they are more likely to report either misconduct or corruption, and if 
employees view their employers in a negative light, they are less likely to report. Employee 
levels of moral and ethical outrage determine whether an employee will report corruption 
or misconduct. When employees have a low level of moral and ethical outrage to certain 
acts, financial incentives might be more likely to motivate the reporting of corruption or 
misconduct.149 In other words, when employees perceive the act (criminal or misconduct) 
as insignificant, monetary incentives play a decisive factor in reporting the alleged act. The 
challenge managers and leaders have is to determine the price tag necessary to persuade 
employees to report corruption and misconduct. If an adequate incentive amount satisfies 
the employee and management, money-priming theory hypothesizes that presenting money 
will make employees work harder and arguably report more misconduct.150 Psychological 
motivation to report corruption increases as the monetary reward does.151 Conversely, 
money-priming theory also speculates that money reduces the concern employees have for 
others.152 Employers must take into account that some employees may actually report less 
because of a holier-than-thou effect in which an employee feels that a moral compass must 
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be ethically and not financially driven.153 Therefore, employers must understand the 
importance of monetary incentives and the employees’ decision to report.  
It must be emphasized that no definitive profile for malicious insiders exists.154 
Since no malicious insider profile exists, positive incentive strategies, such as providing 
money for information regarding insider threats, must be considered as a viable option for 
law enforcement entities. As previously discussed, punishment systems undermine 
employee trust in the organization. Trust is associated with group solidarity, commitment, 
and social identification.155 However, not every employee trusts the organization 
regardless of the organization’s design. Some employees who do not trust the organization 
are not inclined to cooperate and act detrimentally to the organization unless sanctions are 
actually implemented.156 A proactive internal method to identify such employees is 
necessary. 
E. A HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION OF CRIME STOPPERS TO CBP 
This hypothetical scenario of how a program, such as Crime Stoppers, would work 
in CBP is loosely based on the author’s experience in investigating a CBP employee for 
corruption: 
A group of CBP employees engages in corrupt activities, such as allowing narcotics 
to enter illegally between the POEs along the southwest border. The employees also sell 
intelligence reports and border fence keys that allow access through the border barrier to 
drug trafficking organizations. Other employees notice the corrupt employees’ odd 
behavior, such as not working in their assigned areas, working alone despite being assigned 
partners, or disappearing and being unaccounted for during their scheduled work shift. 
Employees notice unusual increased spending habits for the salary the employees earn, but 
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not exorbitant enough to draw management’s attention. Employees are concerned, but do 
not want to report the actions of the corrupt employees overtly because they have not 
witnessed any illicit activity first-hand. Employees also do not want to report the actions 
of the corrupt employees overtly because if they are mistaken, they will live with the stigma 
of being an informant for the rest of their careers.  
In the aforementioned scenario, a tipster working in the same area arguably would 
have noticed the corrupt employees’ odd behavior or may have first-hand knowledge 
regarding criminal activity. The tipster would report this knowledge through either the 
anonymous telephone number or website available to tipsters without fear of reprisal. The 
tipster earns an incentive award as dictated by CBP for reporting corruption. Alternatively, 
as in this hypothetical case, a year-long investigation could have ended much sooner with 
less illicit activity if a tipster provided information leading to the corrupt employees’ arrest. 
All this hypothetical intelligence combined with investigative techniques arguably would 
have directed investigators to the corrupt employees. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed incentive techniques that could be applied to encourage 
employees to report corruption and misconduct while allowing the reporting party to 
remain anonymous. Tenets of an innovative and successful incentive program, such as 
anonymity for the informant, protection against reprisals, monetary incentives (rewards), 
and directly providing information to authority figures, were described and discussed. 
Analysis of rewards and incentives in social dilemmas and other psychological studies 
demonstrated that human behavior leads people to perform certain acts because it is 
beneficial or advantageous. Discussing monetary incentives in particular, research revealed 
that humans see money as a tool that is a means to increase knowledge while at the same 
time making people feel strong and self-sufficient. Research also suggested that even when 
discussing the detrimental effects of a reward-based system, arguments both support and 
challenge such a system. This same research determined that the detrimental effects of a 
reward system could be avoided by understanding the effects of rewards on motivation 
through behavior theory.  
45 
Lastly, the chapter discussed malicious insider profiles. Research determined no 
conclusive profile existed to detect malicious insiders proactively. Research also 
determined that incentive-based reporting systems increased the reporting of corruption. 
However, employees willing to report insider threats may not always be in a position where 
they witness corrupt acts. Therefore, an additional tactic to obtain information is critical to 
mitigating insider threats. One innovative approach to obtaining information directly from 
employees is the NYPD’s VAP.  
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IV. CASE STUDY B: NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT 
VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
This chapter examines the aspects of the NYPD’s VAP and its adaptation for CBP. 
The VAP was examined because it is an innovative proactive intelligence gathering and 
anti-corruption program. The program allows firsthand employee involvement in the 
agency’s anti-corruption strategy and gives CBP an additional tool to mitigate corruption 
and misconduct.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The NYPD has experienced numerous scandals and corruption allegations. Cycles 
of scandals, corruption, and reform have rocked the NYPD from as early as 1894. After a 
major scandal, the NYPD typically sets up a committee to determine the cause and 
recommend a path forward. The Lexow Committee of 1894, the Curran Committee of 
1913, the Seabury Committee of 1930, the Harry Gross investigation of 1950, the Knapp 
Commission of 1971, and the Mollen Commission of 1992, are all examples of 
investigative committees and commissions that delved into corruption at the NYPD.157 
Most agree that the two most memorable corruption investigations faced by the NYPD 
were the Knapp Commission and the Mollen Commission.  
Frank Serpico was a NYPD officer in the late 1960s and 1970s. Frustrated that 
senior NYPD staff did not investigate his allegations of widespread police corruption, 
Serpico took his story to The New York Times.158 The paper subsequently published a 
series of articles regarding Serpico’s allegations that caused John Lindsay, the then-mayor 
of New York City, to appoint a committee to investigate the allegations.159 The committee 
quickly realized the scope of the investigation was massive and requested that Mayor 
Lindsay appoint a full-time commission to conduct the investigation. In May 1970, Lindsay 
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created the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City’s 
Anti-Corruption Procedures, also known as the Knapp Commission, after its chairman, 
Whitman Knapp.160 
The Knapp Commission concluded its investigation in December 1972 and found 
pervasive and well-organized corruption in the NYPD.161 At the conclusion of the 
investigation, the Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption indicated that many 
officers provided the commission information only after they were assured that their 
identities would not be revealed to the NYPD.162 The Knapp Commission Report 
recommended restructuring NYPD’s IA department in conjunction with anticorruption and 
management policies and practice to mitigate organized corruption.163 Other 
recommendations made by the Knapp Commission included eliminating situations that 
expose police to corruption and controlling exposure where the hazards are unavoidable. 
Additional recommendations were to ensure that the public and the police were subject to 
significant risks of detection, apprehension, conviction, and penalties if engaged in 
corruption, to increase incentives for meritorious police performance, to change police 
culture toward corruption, and to generate a climate of reform supported by the public.164 
To address the officers’ concerns regarding anonymity and providing information to the 
commission, the NYPD created an innovative unit to give volunteer officers an opportunity 
to report corruption while shielding their identities from all but a few trusted managers.165 
The unit, which proactively combatted police corruption through intelligence gathering, 
was initially called the Field Associates Program and later renamed the VAP.166 Field 
Associates were members of the Public Morals or Narcotics Divisions (plainclothes units) 
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who volunteered to report evidence of misconduct to the precursor of the IAB, the Field 
Control Division.167  
However, the Knapp Commission’s policies and practices did not evolve over time 
to combat new and innovative corruption trends. In May 1992, approximately 20 years 
after the Knapp Commission, Suffolk County, NY police arrested Michael Dowd and five 
other NYPD officers for participating in a conspiracy to sell narcotics.168 Dowd and his 
co-conspirators, known as the “Seven Five” (for the 75th precinct where they worked) 
became arguably the second-most famous corruption investigation in the NYPD’s history. 
Shortly after Dowd’s arrest, the press disclosed that Dowd had been the subject of more 
than 15 corruption allegations over the previous six years.169 However, the NYPD had 
substantiated none of the allegations, even though evidence proved Dowd’s involvement 
in criminal activity.170 Arguably, the allegations against Dowd were not substantiated 
because of corruption within the NYPD itself and because the NYPD was unable or 
unwilling to police itself. Therefore, in July 1992, David N. Dinkins, the then-mayor of 
New York City, established the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police 
Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department, also known as 
the Mollen Commission, after chairman Judge Milton Mollen, to again investigate 
corruption within the NYPD.171  
The Mollen Commission issued a report of its findings with recommendations in 
July 1994. This report proposed over 100 recommendations, including changes in police 
culture and management, recruiting and hiring standards, internal investigations, increased 
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deterrence and sanctions, and community outreach.172 It found a culture within the NYPD 
that favored ignoring corruption because acknowledging it might reflect poorly on 
management.173 It further determined that without a change in culture, no reforms, 
regardless of how well structured, would mitigate corruption in the NYPD. The Mollen 
Commission recommended a dual-prong approach to cultivate integrity within the ranks of 
the NYPD. The focus of the first prong was on the NYPD’s internal policies and 
operations.174 The second prong focused on creating an independent body that monitored 
NYPD activity.175 The recommendations argued the changes would improve the NYPD’s 
culture and improve integrity by mitigating current cultural norms that would otherwise go 
unchecked. 
The Mollen Commission recommended that the IAB proactively begin 
investigations based on intelligence and analysis instead of relying on a reactive, 
complaint-driven approach.176 One of the proactive approaches to mitigating corruption 
recommended bolstering the VAP and placing it under the direct control of the IAB deputy 
commissioner. The VAP was directed to recruit a unit of officers in the most corruption-
prone precincts who would work as VAP informants.177 These officers, working 
undercover for the VAP, would gather information regarding corruption and provide 
sufficient cause to conduct integrity tests, surveillance, or other proactive investigative 
activity as necessary to prove or disprove illicit officer activity.178  
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B. TENETS 
As in its inception following the Knapp Commission, the VAP remains a support 
unit within the IAB. Today’s VAP continues to function as an intelligence-gathering unit 
rather than an investigations unit. Although VAP members are encouraged to report 
misconduct they observe proactively, IAB investigative units rely on the VAP for 
information or intelligence regarding ongoing IAB investigations. VAP agent coordinators, 
as the VAP detectives (handlers) are known, solicit information from their field agents 
during regular meetings and regularly receive information when the field agent observes 
potential corruption or misconduct. However, an additional and equally important VAP 
function is to obtain specific information requested from IAB investigators. VAP members 
provide IAB investigators with information that likely could not be obtained by other 
investigative means, such as character assessments, secondary or unknown cellular phone 
numbers, subject associates, financial issues, or specific information regarding an 
individual or incident. Investigative tools include character assessments, or assessments 
generated through an analysis of known character traits and actions, secondary or unknown 
cellular phone numbers, or phone numbers kept by employees without the employer’s 
knowledge, subject associates, or persons of interest or persons with known criminal 
histories who associate with the employee, financial issues, or known financial issues the 
employee may have, and lastly, specific information regarding an incident, or specific 
knowledge or involvement an employee may have regarding a topic of interest to the 
employer. 
C. ANONYMITY 
Anonymity is another tenet of the VAP. The only persons with knowledge of VAP 
participant identities are their respective IAB handlers and the supervisory officers of the 
IAB agent coordinators or handlers. VAP participants do not know the identity of other 
VAP participants and thus cannot reveal their participation in the program to anyone. Each 
VAP participant receives a cellular phone with no paper trail leading back to the NYPD. 
Only the IAB handlers know the cellular phone number issued to their VAP participants. 
Secrecy and anonymity are keys to the success of the VAP. Although police databases are 
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arguably secure, an insider threat with hacking abilities, or a non-employee who is an 
experienced hacker, can breach police databases and discover the identity of VAP 
participants. Research conducted by the Defense PERSEREC on documented insider 
threats revealed that hacking into databases was alarmingly common.179 Authors of 
intelligence and counter-intelligence works note the increasing challenge to avoid leaving 
digital traces when purchasing and using electronic devices.180 Therefore, tight controls, 
such as cellular phone numbers with no links to the NYPD, no knowledge of participants’ 
identities by other participants, and strict anonymity protocols decrease the likelihood of 
identification by insider saboteurs. However, all NYPD officers know that the VAP exists 
as a support unit for the IAB; the threat of exposure if an officer engages in corrupt activity 
arguably acts as a deterrent.  
D. PROGRAM SCOPE  
Based on the recommendations from the Mollen Commission, the VAP evolved 
into the program that it is today, which is to gather and disseminate information regarding 
NYPD officers who may be engaged in corruption or other serious misconduct as requested 
by IAB investigators.181 One particular study of NYPD police misconduct argued that a 
higher level of deviance among officers existed among a more vulnerable population, such 
as in a higher crime rate area.182 In other words, misconduct and corruption more 
commonly happen among vulnerable populations where officers believe or residents lack 
the means, or the desire to report misconduct and corruption, given it is the same police 
that “protect” them. However, effectively predicting which employees will engage in 
corruption or other types of serious misconduct is challenging. To date, no research 
demonstrates the effectiveness of predictive modeling in pinpointing which employees will 
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engage in corruption or misconduct. Psychosocial models incorporating behavioral 
indicators and word use analysis show some promise.183 However, word use analysis 
requires employees’ written words (e-mail, reports, texts) or either background or 
psychological evaluations, which provokes privacy concerns. Even with cause to search 
employees’ e-mails or reports, studies have shown that the majority of insider threats have 
not been apprehended due to the actions of security personnel or by electronic means, but 
by their interactions with people.184 Therefore, person-to-person interaction is key to 
successfully mitigating insider threats. 
Peer-to-peer contact and information gathering will give greater insight to 
employees who are possible insider threats or engaged in corruption. Insider threats can 
engage in malicious activity while still appearing to behave legitimately and relevantly.185 
Therefore, contextual information regarding activities performed by insider threats relevant 
to what they are supposed to be doing will help detect normal versus abnormal behavior. 
Consequently, having an eyewitness with proper training to identify behavioral indicators 
that may signal an employee who is at risk for possibly becoming an insider threat is 
beneficial to any organization.186 The VAP provides this benefit to the NYPD. Due to the 
sensitivity of the VAP, a VAP POC provided all information regarding the VAP.187  
Another benefit to the NYPD is that the VAP is voluntary and not mandatory for 
any employee. The VAP, as its title implies, is strictly a volunteer program with no extra 
pay or benefits for the volunteers. VAP participants do earn the ability to apply for sought 
after assignments after a successful tour of duty. However, by the same token, participating 
in the VAP does not guarantee any special assignments or duties or rewards. Unfortunately, 
no information on why volunteers chose to participate in the program was available.  
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E. PROGRAM EFFICACY 
Due to the confidential nature of the VAP, data regarding information provided to 
the VAP, investigations, and efficacy of the VAP program are strictly confidential. 
However, the NYPD now generates an annual report titled Discipline in the NYPD.188 
Conversely, the overall total number of IAB investigations does not appear in these reports, 
but the substantiated cases investigated by the IAB do. The years currently available to the 
public are from 2016 through 2018. 
The NYPD defines a substantiated allegation as: 
When an allegation(s) of misconduct against a police officer is investigated 
and evidence is found to show that the event did occur, that the officer in 
question engaged in the action, and that the act itself was a violation of 
department guidelines, the allegation is deemed by the investigator to be 
‘substantiated.’ Substantiated allegations of misconduct against an officer 
may result in disciplinary action.189  
Data for 2018 indicated that IAB investigations yielded 303 substantiated allegations 
against NYPD officers.190 Of the 303 substantiated allegations, employees with six to 10 
years of service accounted for 30% of the employees facing disciplinary charges while 
employees with 11 to 15 years of service accounted for 27% of employees facing 
disciplinary charges.191 The largest percentage of substantiated cases, 47%, was for 
department rule violations. However, 9% were for firearms violations, 6% were for use of 
force incidents, 5% were for either unlawful or criminal conduct, 4% were for false 
statements, 2% were narcotics related, and 1% was for sexual misconduct.192 Senior or 
tenured officers were involved in most of the substantiated misconduct or criminal activity. 
Data for 2016–2017 yielded similar results for substantiated allegations. The 
NYPD had 551 substantiated allegations, with employees who were on the job six to 10 
 







years of service accounting for 32% of the employees facing disciplinary charges, and 
employees with 11 to 15 years of service accounting for 29% of the employees facing 
disciplinary charges.193 Similar results were also found regarding the types of 
substantiated charges. Department rule violations accounted for 35% of the substantiated 
charges, use of force incidents accounted for 8% of the substantiated charges, false 
statements accounted for 8%, unlawful or criminal conduct accounted for 7%, firearms 
charges accounted for 5%, and 1% accounted for narcotics related charges.194 See Figure 
1. 
 





































Comparatively, CBP had 32,290 total allegations of misconduct between 2006 and 
2011 with 3,554 in 2006, 4,343 in 2007, 4,459 in 2008, 5,352 in 2009, 5,746 in 2010, and 
5,750 in 2011.196 Data was not available on how many of the 32,290 misconduct 
allegations were substantiated. However, if only 25 percent of 32,290 allegations were 
substantiated, this number would yield a total of 8,072 substantiated allegations, a 
substantially larger number than the NYPD’s totals. Additional research is necessary to 
determine if CBP’s and NYPD’s substantiated allegations correlate in any manner, but 
based on totals alone, CBP appears to have a higher incident of employee misconduct 
allegations. 
The “thin blue line” of police secrecy and reluctance to inform management of 
misconduct or criminal activity exists in many if not all law enforcement entities. 
Programs, such as the VAP, provide IA departments, managers, and oversight entities a 
means to gather information regarding employee corruption and misconduct that may not 
otherwise be available to them. As outlined in the previous data, a large percentage of 
senior and or tenured officers engaged in substantiated misconduct or criminal activity. 
Fellow officers feel reluctant to provide information regarding a senior officer for fear of 
retribution, without the promise of anonymity. 
As demonstrated by the previous data, incumbent employees with six to 15 years 
accounted for the largest percentage of employees facing either criminal or disciplinary 
charges in the NYPD from 2016 to 2018. Such employees accused of crimes or misconduct 
have been on the job for several years and may already have a trusted group of allies or 
confidants. This factor limits VAP participants’ entry into this circle of trust.  
VAP participants may have to spend several months or years in a certain station or 
precinct before they gain the trust of incumbent employees. Arguably, the most obvious 
challenge is the wariness that incumbent employees have when a newly graduated officer 
first arrives at a unit or precinct. This wariness is generally overcome in time as the VAP 
participant works alongside tenured officers on a daily basis. As the VAP participant 
becomes more familiar with the incumbent officers, the participants can maneuver 
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themselves into a prime intelligence gathering position. Employees monitoring other 
employees are one of the most effective techniques to identify corruption or other unethical 
behavior, especially in an organization as large as the NYPD.197 Therefore, it is extremely 
important that the newly arrived VAP member be patient and not overly aggressive in 
joining precinct or unit in-groups without going through the customary “rites of passage.” 
Once the VAP participants are a fixture at the unit or precinct, they generally have 
unlimited access to intelligence and information that flows freely from employee to 
employee. The risk of identity spillage is greater if VAP participants force their way into a 
tight-knit group instead of organically joining. A patient handler and investigative team 
would more likely discover information regarding the activities of an insider threat. 
Patience and shrewd tactics must not be overlooked to conduct a hasty investigation 
without the full integration of the VAP participants into their new roles.  
Even though the VAP program provides a valuable additional tool to IAB 
investigators, the program does have additional challenges. One key challenge faced by the 
IAB is the misconception held by NYPD staff that VAP members are investigators who 
conduct self-directed proactive investigations to obtain intelligence or information.198 
Although VAP members are encouraged to report criminality or misconduct to their 
handlers, such reporting is not their primary role. The VAP participants’ primary goal is to 
be the eyes and ears for the IAB and to provide information they obtain through either their 
daily activities or work routines. The VAP participants’ secondary goal is to obtain 
information when directed by their IAB handlers on a specific target. VAP members are 
frontline officers with unprecedented access to in-group activities and conversations that 
would otherwise be unknown to IAB investigators. Conducting self-directed proactive 
surveillance or befriending a target they would otherwise not engage with might 
compromise both the VAP member’s identity and safety. However, because of the VAP 
members’ access to other frontline employees, the ability to report changes in employee 
behavior or discussions regarding planned or previous misconduct cannot be dismissed. 
 
197 Michael J. Scicchitano et al., “Peer Reporting to Control Employee Theft,” Security Journal 17, no. 
2 (2004): 7–19.  
198 Jeffrey Liss, email message to author, November 6, 2018. 
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Research into defending against insider threats demonstrated that insider threats generally 
have observable traits that are reliable markers to future or on-going misconduct.199 The 
VAP participants’ ability to witness and report these observable traits cannot be 
underestimated.  
Another challenge faced by the VAP is participant retention. A bond built on trust 
is cultivated between the handler and the participant. When an agent coordinator or handler 
retires or transfers out of the VAP, participants historically elect to opt-out of the program 
for fear their identities maybe compromised if they are assigned to either a different 
coordinator or handler.200 As per the VAP coordinator, the trust garnered between the 
participant and the handler through years of working together is difficult to maintain if the 
handler abruptly leaves the VAP. To combat the exodus of participants when coordinators 
retire or transfer, the NYPD instituted a policy wherein pending retirement or transfer, the 
departing coordinators have several face-to-face meetings between the participants and 
their replacement coordinators.201 Empirical data demonstrated that the planned transition 
from one agent coordinator to another aids in participant retention; however, due to the 
sensitive nature of the program, exact figures were unavailable.202 However, a policy of 
this nature may reduce the number of VAP participants who opt out when the agent 
coordinators retire or transfer. 
Research into criminality using intelligence cycles determined that people choose 
between committing crimes and not committing them if the reward for committing the 
crime is desirable.203 In other words, the perceived risk versus reward, or potential 
consequences, determines the likelihood of engaging in criminality. Hence, if officers 
believe they can get away with a criminal act or misconduct, the probability of engaging 
in the activity increases. Additional insider threat research argues that when people realize 
 
199 Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners,” 11–30. 
200 Jeffrey Liss, email message to author, November 6, 2018. 
201 Jeffrey Liss, email message to author, November 6, 2018. 
202 Jeffrey Liss, email message to author, November 6, 2018. 
203 Denis F. O’Leary, “Approaching Career Criminals with an Intelligence Cycle” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 13, http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1009185. 
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that in-group members engage in criminality, they themselves are more likely to engage in 
that behavior as well.204 Therefore, an organization that discourages in-group members 
from engaging in illicit activities by varying means is more likely to foster a culture that 
discourages such behavior. Since NYPD employees know about the VAP and its 
participants’ anonymity, such awareness heightens the risk versus reward, and thus creates 
the greater likelihood of being discovered if engaging in criminal or unsavory activity. This 
increased risk in being discovered by an anonymous source thus lowers an employee’s 
willingness to participate in nefarious activity. 
Another risk VAP participants face is social norms that stigmatize informants. 
Informants who report on employees who have earned their trust are not kindly looked 
upon. The titles of “rat,” “stool pigeon,” or “stoolie,” are not titles of pride. However, when 
distancing themselves from the social norms of one group and looking at the greater good 
of their mission through a different lens, the removal of criminals hiding behind a badge is 
something VAP participants can take pride in doing. In other words, being part of a unit 
that engages in corruption is shameful to a serious public servant. This realization does not 
mean that all will accept the methods used by the VAP, and once again, anonymity is 
paramount to everyone in the program. Social norms also play a role in decision making 
by potential offenders. Research regarding social norms indicates that when the probability 
of apprehension increases, improper conduct is considered less justified.205 If officers 
believe in a greater probability of being caught when engaging in improper conduct 
because of the unknown number of VAP participants, improper conduct is less justifiable, 
and NYPD officers are less likely to engage in the aforementioned conduct. 
 
204 Akanksha Vashisth and Avinash Kumar, “Corporate Espionage: The Insider Threat,” Business 
Information Review 30, no. 2 (June 2013): 87, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0266382113491816. 
205 Salima Douhou, Jan R. Magnus, and Arthur van Soest, “Peer Reporting and the Perception of 




The process of becoming a VAP member generally begins early in an officer’s 
career. The IAB typically recruits volunteers while the officer is a cadet at the academy, 
though incumbent officers can also volunteer to be part of the VAP. IAB staff conducts 
cadet integrity training for cadet classes at the NYPD academy and provides information 
regarding the VAP during that training. Integrity training includes information regarding 
corruption hazards, consequences of engaging in corruption or other illicit activities, and a 
general introduction into the VAP mission. If a cadet expresses interest in the VAP, IAB 
staff speaks to the cadet individually and a rigorous vetting process begins. If the cadet 
successfully passes the enhanced vetting process, the cadet receives additional training 
required to become a VAP participant. Once approved, the VAP participant signs a 
memorandum of understanding confirming and acknowledging the duties and restrictions 
of the VAP.206 
In addition to the VAP, the NYPD receives complaints regarding corruption or 
misconduct through various means. The public provides complaints regarding employee 
corruption and misconduct. The Conflicts of Interest Board, an independent city agency, 
also refers complaints to the NYPD. The Commission to Combat Police Corruption and 
the Inspector General for the NYPD perform audits, studies, and analyses, and make 
recommendations regarding policies, programs, and practices. Lastly, all NYPD 
employees must report corruption and misconduct. However, because VAP participants 
are anonymous and not known to the rank and file, employees can report corruption or 
misconduct to their supervisors or directly to the IAB.207  
G. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
This hypothetical scenario presents how a program, such as the VAP, would work 
in CBP, using the author’s experience in investigating a CBP employee for corruption: 
 
206 Author requested information from the NYPD regarding insider threats within the VAP. The NYPD 
VAP Point of Contact (POC) advised that the NYPD constantly monitor participants to ensure they do not 
engage in illicit activities but did not provide information regarding how participants are monitored. 
207 Jeffrey Liss, email message to author, November 6, 2018. 
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A group of CBP employees engages in corruption-related activities, such as 
allowing narcotics to enter illegally between the POEs along the southwest border. The 
employees also sell intelligence reports and border fence keys that allow access through 
the border barrier to drug trafficking organizations. Other employees notice the corrupt 
employees’ odd behavior, such as not working in their assigned areas, working alone when 
assigned partners, or disappearing and being unaccounted for during their scheduled work 
shift. Employees notice unusual increased spending habits for the salary the employees 
earn, but not exorbitant enough to draw management’s attention. Employees are concerned, 
but do not want to report the actions of the corrupt employees because they have not 
witnessed any illicit activity first-hand. Employees do not want to report the actions of the 
corrupt employees because if they are mistaken, they will live with the stigma of being an 
informant for the rest of their careers.  
In the aforementioned scenario, a VAP participant working in the same area would 
have noticed the corrupt employees’ odd behavior and reported it through the chain of 
command. Alternatively, as in this hypothetical case, a year-long investigation could have 
ended much sooner with less illicit activity if a VAP participant were directed to gather 
intelligence by the IA agents investigating the corrupt employees. The VAP participant 
would be directed to gather intelligence in this case because of access to the corrupt 
employees, but also the access of other employees who noticed the odd behavior, spending 
habits, and discussed the situation among themselves. All this hypothetical intelligence 
gained through a VAP participant combined with investigative techniques would have 
directed investigators to the corrupt employees. 
H. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, at-risk employee research indicated that managers and co-workers 
witnessed employees who exhibited signs of stress and disgruntlement among other issues, 
but do not alert anyone.208 Alerts were not raised because they are not aware of the severity 
of the behavior, or due to the fear of reprisal should someone become aware of their 
 
208 Greitzer et al., Identifying At-Risk Employees, iii.  
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notification. Since VAP members are anonymous rank-and-file officers, noticing 
suspicious behavior or acquiring such information is highly likely due to their daily 
interaction with subjects of an IAB investigation. Conversely, empirical studies into the 
development of insider threats indicate that employees displaying the potential for 
becoming an insider threat are typically known to their agency’s human resource and 
security offices because of their counterproductive interpersonal behaviors.209 Research 
does not indicate whether internal investigations follow, but rather only that the employees 
are known to management. This chapter found that having employees trained to report 
changes in behavior or other suspicious activity is essential to ensure that appropriate 
measures are taken to mitigate misconduct or corruption. The implications for a VAP-type 
program in CBP include better situational awareness of possible employee corruption and 
misconduct through first-hand information gathering capabilities. Additionally, employee 
awareness of a VAP-type program will arguably create an atmosphere where corruption 
and misconduct are not tolerated.  
 
209 ErShaw, Fischer, and Rose, Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit, 39. 
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V. MASTER MODEL POLICY  
The master model policy for a proactive insider threat mitigation strategy for the 
CBP would combine elements of incentives and punishments previously discussed. The 
incentive program could be modeled after the Crime Stoppers program. The incentive 
program would allow employees to provide information anonymously to CBP management 
regarding corruption or misconduct with the knowledge that if the information led to an 
arrest or other pre-determined administrative action against the offending employees, some 
type of incentive award would be offered to the reporting party. The anonymity tenet of 
the incentive program encourages participation in a way that openness would not. All 
employees who contact CBP OPR under the incentive program would do so assured of 
secrecy and protection of their identity. The employee would receive a unique identifier 
upon contacting CBP OPR. Only CBP OPR and the employees would know the unique 
identifier attached to the information provided. Should the information provided by the 
employees lead to the arrest, apprehension, or discovery of serious employee misconduct, 
incentive rewards would be offered to the employees. This form of compensation mirrors 
one of the methods used in other incentive programs, which allows participating employees 
to maintain complete anonymity. Other options CBP can use include time off awards, 
which are vacation days awarded to employees that do not diminish the employees’ earned 
vacation days, or quality step increases (QSI), which grant an increase in pay before the 
normal step increase time increments.  
The punishment aspect is a program modeled after the VAP. Prior to 
implementation of the VAP program, the entire CBP workforce would learn about the VAP 
through agency-wide notifications via electronic mail and video presentations. The 
notification would serve a dual purpose. First, the notification would make all employees 
aware that VAP participants work among them with the goal of encouraging employees to 
adhere to CBP policies and regulations. Second, the notification would draw attention to 
the program and possibly garner new participants or new investigatory leads. After such 
public notifications, CBP OPR personnel would conduct awareness training at the CBP 
academies.  
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CBP OPR personnel would provide integrity awareness training to new employees 
at each of the three basic CBP academies and inform the new employees of the VAP. If 
any employees express interest in the VAP, the employees would speak to CBP OPR staff 
individually and undergo additional vetting. If the employees successfully complete the 
additional vetting, the employees would undergo additional VAP training. Training would 
be developed prior to the implementation of the VAP to address the duties and 
responsibilities of every VAP participant. VAP participants would undergo training 
individually at an undisclosed facility to ensure their anonymity. This training could be 
done prior to the employees reporting to their duty stations or could be conducted remotely 
to safeguard the participants’ identities. During this training, the VAP participants would 
be assigned CBP OPR handlers. The CBP OPR handlers and the VAP participants would 
meet and ensure that a good working relationship is established through rapport building 
and mentoring. If the CBP OPR handlers and the VAP participants could not work well 
together, different CBP OPR handlers would be assigned to the VAP participants. It is 
extremely important that the CBP OPR handlers and the VAP participants gel and work as 
a team to ensure no miscommunication occurs and the goals of each team member are the 
same.  
Only the CBP OPR handlers and CBP OPR management would know the identities 
of all VAP participants. After successful vetting and training, the VAP participants would 
be issued a cellular phone without a paper trail leading to CBP OPR to communicate with 
the participants’ handlers. Only the handlers and CBP OPR management would know the 
cellular phone numbers assigned to the participants. The participants could not disclose 
their role in the VAP to any person. The participants’ anonymity is paramount for 
individuals, as well as for program success. Therefore, if the VAP participants’ identities 
were ever compromised, the volunteers could no longer participate in the VAP program.  
The CBP OPR VAP would be a strictly volunteer program and would confer no 
additional pay or benefits outside of the psychological gratification for protecting the 
agency’s mission. All employees who wished to become VAP participants must be 
completely aware of the lack of monetary benefits that accrue from being a VAP 
participant. However, consideration after a successful VAP tour of duty would be taken 
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into account for promotions or special assignments but would not guarantee selection. VAP 
tours of duty would vary on each individual agreement between the participants and CBP 
OPR. Typically, VAP rotations would range from three to five years; however, the time 
frame would be extended if CBP OPR and the participants agree on the extension. 
Justification to extend the contract may include an on-going investigation in which the 
participants play a crucial role or a relationship between participants and possible targets 
of pending investigations.  
Figure 2 shows a hypothetical hierarchy flow chart with the IOD call center, or the 
Joint Intake Center (JIC) where the VAP Program Manager reports directly to the OID 
Executive Director and the VAP participants report to their component for their primary 
duties and to the VAP Program Manager as their secondary duty. See Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. VAP Participant Hierarchy Flow Chart. 
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A. IMPLEMENTATION 
A workgroup consisting of CBP OPR managers, supervisors, and agents would 
generate a working draft policy implementing the incentive and voluntary assistance 
programs. The working draft should include related CBP policies, authorities, and standard 
operating procedures. Once completed by the workgroup, the working draft would be sent 
to the CBP OPR Special Agents in Charge (SACs) in all OPR areas of responsibility for 
their review and input. After review and input by field SACs, the working group would re-
review the working draft for any necessary edits, deletions, or additions. The CBP Office 
of Chief Counsel must review the draft policy and provide legal advice to ensure the policy 
abides by all federal rules, laws, and regulations.  
Concurrent to the working draft policy, revamping or updating the integrity training 
program must be requested from the CBP Office of Training and Development (OTD). The 
training must include information regarding the proposed incentive program, as well as the 
voluntary assistance program. The training must meet all required OTD and OPR 
prerequisites and fall within CBP’s National Training Plan of mandated courses for all CBP 
employees. 
Consideration of a temporary trial period, or a field trial, should be considered to 
ensure proper implementation. An incremental incorporation of the policy along CBP’s 
busiest corridors would offer CBP executive staff an opportunity to review the program’s 
successes and challenges. A field trial would also afford CBP executive staff the 
opportunity to poll the CBP workforce on the program’s efficacy and acceptance. 
Prior to the implementation of such a sweeping proactive policy, the project would 
require approval from the CBP Commissioner, the OPR Assistant Commissioner, and the 
OPR Investigative Operations Division (IOD) Executive Director. The CBP Office of 
Chief Counsel and the Office of Labor and Employee Relations must also review and 
comment on draft policy documents. CBP’s field components, such as the U.S. Border 
Patrol, the Office of Field Operations, and the Office of Air and Marine, should be given 
the opportunity to review and comment on the proposed policy and training materials.  
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B. CHALLENGES 
Some organizational challenges to changing a complaint-driven approach to a 
proactive, intelligence-based format have been raised. Ensuring that smart practices and 
lessons learned from the NYPD VAP be incorporated into the CBP VAP would mitigate 
miscalculations during the creation and implementation phases. The NYPD, like CBP, has 
a workforce under a union bargaining agreement. Although bargaining units cannot dictate 
policy and operations, input and buy-in from the NTEU and NBPC would reduce resistance 
to the new programs and ensure the efficient implementation of the policy. 
Additional challenges include creating a policy that does not contradict current 
federal laws and employee protections. Since the research evaluated two unique programs 
not currently used in CBP, research to ensure program implementation in CBP does not 
either violate federal laws or employee protections is necessary. Coordination with CBP 
components is also necessary, as it is the component for employees who will participate in 
both programs. Careful deliberation with the CBP Office of Chief Counsel and Office of 
Labor Employee Relations during the creation of the new policy must occur. Incorporating 
a representative from the CBP Office of Chief Counsel and the Office of Labor Employee 
Relations into the draft phase would decrease the time each office requires to review the 
final draft policy. 
A cost-benefit analysis for both programs should be considered prior to 
implementation. Additional positions in the JIC, as well as a VAP program manager, may 
be required. Locating a funding source for the incentive program with funding 
requirements for future years are also required. No additional positions are required for 
VAP participants, as the participants are recruited from employees already in CBP. No 
additional organizational changes are expected and therefore no additional costs for 
organizational structure modifications are anticipated. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This research demonstrated that behavioral models have thus far been unable to 
predict who will become an insider threat. This research found that psychosocial modeling 
also failed to predict accurately why employees engage in corruption. However, further 
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research in these fields should help to determine whether one model or a combination or 
models might yield better results in predicting which employees were likely to become 
insider threats.  
This research found that intelligence and information gathering, as well as 
incentive-based programs, have been used successfully to identify insider threats in a law 
enforcement environment and to obtain information regarding criminal activity. However, 
additional research is required to determine whether CBP employees can participate in an 
incentive-based information program. Some government agencies bar employees from 
receiving incentives for information acquired through their work in the federal government. 
Yet, some programs, such as the False Claims Act, and programs instituted by the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Securities Exchange Commission, do allow certain federal 
employees to receive monetary rewards for information provided during an 
investigation.210 However, the two aforementioned incentive programs are very specific 
incentive awards programs regarding either IRS fraud or fraudulent claims for payment 
that do not translate well to reporting criminal activity or misconduct within CBP. 
Additional research and legal advice into this topic is necessary. 
This research aimed to provide CBP executive leadership with options to mitigate 
insider threats within the agency. This research highlighted two non-traditional but highly 
innovative options. Rigorous research was conducted to determine the feasibility of 
implementing such programs in CBP. The research concluded that implementing an 
incentive-based program and a program similar to the VAP is feasible if no laws bar 
bargaining unit employees from participating in such programs. Careful coordination with 
the CBP Office of Chief Counsel would mitigate any hurdles that might delay the 
implementation of such programs. Based on research on rewards and incentives in social 
dilemmas and other psychological studies, as well as inability to predict employee behavior 
scientifically, the author strongly recommends that Homeland Security leaders and 
practitioners consider adopting these programs or adaptations of them to current efforts 
and on-going insider threat mitigation programs. 
 
210 Ferziger and Currell, “Snitching for Dollars,” 1–4. 
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Research to determine program efficacy and to determine program modifications 
must be continuous. Additional and continuous research on behavioral models is required 
to determine if new data becomes available regarding predicting insider threats. Further 
research is also required on the efficacy of incentive-based programs when utilized in law 
enforcement agencies. If implemented, continuous review of both programs will be 
required to track efficacy and make improvements as necessary. Based on research, CBP 
should expect additional information regarding employee corruption and misconduct as 
soon as both programs are fully implemented. 
Mitigating insider threats in CBP is of utmost importance in safeguarding the 
integrity of this nation’s frontline homeland security enterprise. CBP employees protect 
America from persons who wish to cause harm while at the same time promoting legitimate 
trade and travel. One corrupt employee has the ability to cause irreversible damage.  
Front line supervisors first protect against insider threats; however, even good 
supervisors need help maintaining a functioning workforce while at the same time 
mitigating employee corruption and misconduct. Expecting frontline supervisors to 
identify every and all employees who may pose an insider threat in a complex work 
environment is unreasonable. Implementing insider threat mitigation programs will better 
prepare CBP to identify these troubled employees. 
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